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Trade Mark Monopolies in the Digital Age 
 
Abstract 
This article reviews the core ground of infringement for trade marks covering cases of 
“double identity”. It argues that this ground should protect two distinct monopolies that 
the owners of trade marks enjoy. Their demand-side monopoly should give them the 
exclusive right to use their trade marks as resources for branding and differentiating 
products of a particular kind and turning them into specific objects of demand. Their 
supply-side monopoly should give them exclusive control over the supply of products 
that can satisfy that demand. This article argues that the core ground of infringement 
should address each monopoly and their ancillary aspects directly, taking account of the 
specific set of issues that they raise. The core ground should show how each monopoly 
contributes to the overall role of trade marks in commercial life and explain their main 
legal features. This article reviews the Court of Justice’s development of the core ground 
from this perspective and argues that this helps to explain some of the difficulties 
associated with this case law.   
 
1. Introduction 
Trade marks are awarded to promote fair and effective competition by enabling firms 
and other undertakings (“firms”) to brand their products and differentiate them from 
other products on the market.1Firms can then compete to attract demand to the 
                                                          
1 The term “undertaking” means a firm or any other business structure or organisation that can function as 
a cohesive unit: Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 at [38]-[39]. It includes a business 
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branded products in particular (“specific demand”). Trade marks can go further than 
this and enable firms to brand their products on the basis that they have a specific 
level of quality and a specific combination of features and other characteristics in 
common that differentiates them from other products of the same kind.2 As well as 
having the exclusive right to use the relevant sign for this purpose, the proprietor (or 
“owner”) of a trade mark has the exclusive right to determine which products of the 
relevant kind are to be branded and differentiated in this way and can therefore satisfy 
the specific demand that the trade mark attracts.3 
Branded products attract specific demand for various reasons. A key factor is 
that consumers are seeking the particular combination of quality and characteristics 
that a brand represents and branding is a good basis for obtaining information about 
the likely quality and characteristics of products. Moreover, the exclusivity of a brand 
establishes a form of commercial accountability for branded products and this can be 
a valuable source of reassurance about product quality and other matters of potential 
interest or concern to consumers. Branding products thereby helps to mitigate the 
risks of disappointment that consumers would otherwise face and reduces their 
search costs.4 Enabling firms to use trade marks to brand products and attract 
                                                                                                                                                                          
organisation consisting of a number of separate legal entities as long as they are subject to a single point 
of ultimate control such as a group of companies: Case C-520/09 Arkema v European Commission [2011] 
ECR I-8901 at [37]. This article will use the term “firm” to refer to an undertaking unless the context 
requires otherwise. 
2 Andrew (John) v Kuehnrich (1913) 30 RPC 677(CA). On this capacity, see T. da Silva Lopes and M. 
Casson, “Entrepreneurship and the Development of Global Brands”, (2007) 81 Business History Review 
651-680 at 655. 
3 Major Bros. v Franklin [1908] 1 KB 712 (HC); Primark v Lollypop Clothing [2001] ETMR 334 (HC); 
Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789. 
4 G. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, (1970) 84 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 488-500; W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, “Trademark Law: An 
Economic Perspective”, (1987) 30 Journal of Law and Economics 265-309; N. Economides, “The 
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specific demand to them means that firms can seek to gain a sustainable competitive 
advantage based on the quality and characteristics of these products, the credibility of 
the quality assurance they can provide and their own quality and other characteristics 
as firms.  
Trade marks enable firms to brand products and to compete to attract specific 
demand to them even if they do not deal directly with consumers and have to 
communicate with them across intermediaries and reach them through a distribution 
chain. This facility became important as greater space opened up between producers 
and consumers in the organisation of economic activity.5 It has become especially 
important with the forms of communication and transacting that have arisen in the 
digital age.6 Their provision of this facility underlies the claim made by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union (“CJEU”) that trade marks are an essential element in a 
system of undistorted competition.7 The European Commission has credited trade 
marks with creating value and growth, promoting investment in research and 
development, contributing to “a continuous process of product improvement and 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Economics of Trademarks”, (1988) 78 Trademark Reporter 523-539; S.L. Dogan and M.A. Lemley, 
“Trademark and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet”, (2004) 41 Houston Law Review 777-838. 
5 The sociologist Zygmunt Bauman has noted how the opening up of “an extendable space” between the 
act of production and the act of consumption meant that “each of the two acts acquired growing autonomy 
from the other” and how “history could be written in terms of the ingenious ways in which that space was 
colonized and administered”: Z. Bauman, Consuming Life (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2007) at 26. 
6 This article uses the term “the digital age” to refer to the impact of the internet, digital technology and 
associated transformations in communication, marketing and transacting: see, for example, E. Mendelson, 
“In the Depths of the Digital Age”, The New York Review of Books, 23 June 2016, volume 63, no. 11.  
7 “In such a system, undertakings must be able to attract and retain customers by the quality of their 
products or services, which is made possible only by distinctive signs allowing them to be identified”: 
Case C-349/95 Loendersloot (Frits) v Ballantine [1997] ECR I-6227 at [22], citing the court’s judgments 
in Case C-10/89 Cnl Sucal v Hag [1990] ECR I-3711 at [13]; and Case C-427/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb v 
Paranova [1996] ECR I-3457at [43].  
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development” and benefiting employment.8 The exclusivity of a trade mark to one firm 
along with that firm’s exclusive right to determine which products the trade mark 
brands and differentiates are together the legal basis of its economic role. 
Like other intellectual property rights, the exclusivity of a trade mark involves 
the award of a limited monopoly to its owner, which in this case covers the use of the 
sign registered as a trade mark in relation to the sale or other marketing of products of 
the kind or kinds for which it is registered.9 In the European Union, the trade mark 
directive (“the Directive”) has secured this monopoly through conferring certain 
exclusive rights on the owner of a trade mark.10 In particular, the owner is entitled to 
                                                          
8 European Commission, “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to 
approximate the Laws of the Member States relating to Trade Marks”, COM (2013) 162 final, 2013/ 0089 
at 1. See also the World Intellectual Property Organisation, 2013: World Intellectual Property Report: 
Brands – Reputation and Image in the Global Marketplace (WIPO Economics and Statistics Series, 
2013). 
9 The term “marketing” is used in trade mark law to refer generally to the commercialisation of marked 
products through offering them for sale or through some other kind of transaction. However, the term is 
also used to refer to  the economic activity in which firms engage in order to promote their products to 
consumers, attract specific demand to them and secure customer loyalty: see, for example, P.F. Drucker, 
“Marketing and Economic Development”, (1958) 22 Journal of Marketing 252-259 at 253; and G.T. 
Gundlach, and W.L. Wilkie, “The American Marketing Association’s New Definition of Marketing: 
Perspective and Commentary on the 2007 Revision”, (2009) 28 Journal of Public Policy and Marketing 
259-264. On the importance of marketing in the latter sense to the development of firms, see, for 
example, R. Church and A. Godley, “The Emergence of Modern Marketing: International Dimensions”, 
(2003) 45 Business History 1-5; T. da Silva Lopes and M. Casson, “Entrepreneurship and the 
Development of Global Brands”, (2007) 81 Business History Review 651-680; T. da Silva Lopes and P. 
Guimaraes, “Trademarks and British Dominance in Consumer Goods, 1876-1914”, (2014) 67 Economic 
History Review 793-817. This article will use the term in both senses, according to the context. 
10 Directive 89/104/EEC of 21 December 1988, which Directive 2008/95/EC of 22 October 2008 
subsequently codified (as amended). 
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prohibit unauthorised third parties from using the relevant sign in the course of trade 
“in relation to” products of an identical kind to those for which the trade mark is 
registered.11 The CJEU’s judgments on this core ground of infringement have provided 
uncertain guidance, attracted criticism and prompted calls for reform.12 The revised 
directive adopted in December 2015 (“the 2015 Directive”) has recast the Directive,13 
but has specified the core ground of infringement in substantially the same terms.14 It 
has not provided further clarification or done much to resolve the difficulties. 
This article will argue that one cause of these difficulties is that the core 
ground of infringement in fact protects two complementary monopolies. There is a 
demand-side monopoly, which reflects the exclusive right of the owner to use its trade 
mark to brand products of the relevant kind and differentiate them from others of the 
same kind. There is also a supply-side monopoly, which reflects the owner’s exclusive 
right to determine which products of the relevant kind are to be branded and 
differentiated in this way and can legitimately satisfy the specific demand that the 
trade mark attracts. These two monopolies should reinforce each other and together 
should ensure that trade marks facilitate undistorted competition and achieve the 
other economic objectives of trade mark law. However, the CJEU’s elaboration of the 
core ground of infringement has not addressed them separately. This article will argue 
that it should do so. Among other benefits, addressing the supply-side monopoly 
                                                          
11 The Directive, art. 5(1)(a). 
12 See, for example, M. Senftleben, “Function Theory and International Exhaustion: Why it is Wise to 
confine the Double Identity Rule in EU Trade Mark Law to Cases affecting the Origin Function”, (2014) 
36 EIPR 518-524; A. Kur, “Trade Marks function don’t they? CJEU Jurisprudence and Unfair 
Competition Practices”, (2014) 45 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 
434-454; J. Tarawneh, “A New Classification for Trade Mark Functions”, [2016] IPQ 352-370. 
13 Directive 2015/2436 of 16 December 2015 to approximate the laws of the Member States relating to 
trade marks (Recast) (“the 2015 Directive”). The 2015 Directive entered into force on 15 January 2016 
and member states have three years to implement the changes that it requires. 
14 The 2015 Directive has recast the core ground of infringement in article 10(2)(a). 
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separately would help to provide a clearer explanation for its territorial dimension in 
European Union law in accordance with the Union’s principle of the regional 
exhaustion of the owner’s rights.15 It would also bring out more clearly how firms can 
use trade marks not only to brand products as theirs, but also to establish and protect 
brands that achieve a high degree of customisation and differentiation in terms of 
their quality and other characteristics. 
This article will argue that a further cause of difficulty with the CJEU’s 
specification of the core ground of infringement is the fact that each of the two 
monopolies has ancillary aspects that contribute to a trade mark’s capacity to perform 
its intended economic role and should improve its effectiveness at doing so. These 
ancillary aspects should reflect and reinforce the relevant monopoly and require legal 
protection accordingly. This article will argue that the core ground should address the 
respective ancillary aspects of each monopoly separately as well. Instead, the CJEU’s 
elaboration of the core ground has attempted to provide a universal formulation that 
purports to cover all these aspects even though they raise different sets of issues. For 
example, on the demand side, a trade mark may perform up to two ancillary 
operational functions in addition to its core operational function of providing a means 
of branding and differentiating products of the relevant kind. It can perform these 
ancillary functions through providing a convenient means of referring to the branded 
products in communication. First, the owner can use the trade mark in advertising 
                                                          
15 Under the Directive, the supply-side monopoly applies at the point of first marketing in the European 
Economic Area (“EEA”): Case C-355/96 Silhouette v Hartlauer [1998] ECR I-4799; Case C-173/98 Sebago 
v GB-Unic [1999] ECR I-4103; Joined Cases C-414/99-C-416/99 Zino Davidoff v A & G Imports [2001] 
ECR I-8691. On the principle of the exhaustion of rights and its “national”, “regional” and “international” 
variants,  see K.E. Maskus, “Parallel Imports”, (2000) 23 World Economy 1269-1284 at 1270; K. Saggi, 
“Regional Exhaustion of Intellectual Property”, (2014) 10 International Journal of Economic Theory 125-
137 at 125-126; K.E. Maskus, “Economic Perspectives on Exhaustion and Parallel Imports”, in I. Calboli 
and E. Lee (eds), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Exhaustion and Parallel Imports (Edward 
Elgar, 2016) 106-124 at 106-107. 
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and promotional activity to alert consumers to the branded products, convey 
information about them and solicit specific demand for them. This facility is of 
particular importance to firms that do not deal with consumers directly. For some 
products, it may also enable the owner to add intangible quality to the branded 
products through associating them with a particular image or set of values.16 Secondly, 
consumers can use the trade mark as a reference point in searches and enquiries to 
seek and acquire information about the branded products. Where the trade mark 
signifies verbally, consumers can use it in requests to express specific demand. Where 
the owner does not deal directly with consumers, this facility should enable it to “reel 
in” specific demand and ensure that third parties satisfy this demand only with 
branded products. 
To ensure that the trade mark can perform these two ancillary operational 
functions effectively, the core ground of infringement should give the owner control 
over how third parties use the trade mark as a reference point. This ancillary control 
should apply both to third parties’ referential use of it in their advertising and other 
communication with consumers and to third parties’ responses to consumers’ 
referential use of it in searches, enquiries and requests. However, this ancillary control 
does not need to be absolute in either case. On the contrary, the objective of 
promoting competition requires that there should be significant qualification of the 
owner’s control in both of these contexts. There are similar ancillary issues with core 
ground’s protection of the supply-side monopoly. This monopoly gives the owner 
absolute control to determine which products constitute branded products at the 
point of first marketing in the European Economic Area (“EEA”). Here, the owner 
                                                          
16 For example, the CJEU has treated “the allure and prestigious image” of luxury goods “which bestows 
on them an aura of luxury” as contributing to the “quality” of such goods and worthy of protection: Case 
C-59/08 Copad v Christian Dior Couture  [2009] ECR I-3421 at [24]-[26]. For a critical evaluation of this 
capacity, see J. Davis and S.M. Maniatis, “Trademarks, Brands, and Competition” in T. da Silva Lopes 
and P. Duguid (eds), Trademarks, Brands, and Competitiveness (Routledge, 2013) (paperback edition) 
119-137.  
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needs some ancillary control over whether or not goods that it has already marketed 
under the trade mark within the EEA should constitute marked products for further 
marketing. The owner needs this control so that it can protect the integrity of the 
particular product customisation and differentiation that the trade mark signifies and 
helps to establish. It is also necessary to protect the basis on which the trade mark 
signifies and establishes commercial accountability for the branded products and may 
thereby provide quality assurance and other reassurance to consumers. Nevertheless, 
these factors do not require giving the owner absolute control over the use of the trade 
mark for further marketing. Instead, significant qualification of the owner’s control is 
necessary to facilitate intra-brand competition and minimise the scope for territorial 
price discrimination.17 Here as well, the CJEU’s elaboration of the core ground of 
infringement has not provided a clear framework for calibrating this ancillary aspect of 
the supply-side monopoly. 
The CJEU’s elaboration of the core ground has refined its scope by reference to 
its protection of various functions that a trade mark should perform. These do not 
readily map onto the various operational roles that a trade mark may perform on the 
demand side or explain the ancillary aspect of the supply-side monopoly. The CJEU 
has relied on the need to protect the so-called “essential function” of a trade mark to 
secure its owner’s demand-side and supply-side monopolies.18 However, it has 
                                                          
17 Price discrimination occurs when a firm is able to charge different prices for the same or very similar 
products to different consumers or groups of consumers: see, for example, R. Van den Bergh and P. 
Camasasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective (Sweet & Maxwell, 
London 2006) at 254-257.  On territorial price discrimination in this context, see K.E. Maskus, 
“Economic Perspectives on Exhaustion and Parallel Imports”, in I. Calboli and E. Lee (eds), Research 
Handbook on Intellectual Property Exhaustion and Parallel Imports (Edward Elgar, 2016) 106-124 at 
112-113. See further R. Schmalensee, “Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree 
Price Discrimination”, (1981) 71 American Economic Review 242-247. 
18 The “essential function” of a trade mark is to “guarantee the identity of the origin of the trade-marked 
product to the consumer or ultimate user, by enabling him without any possibility of confusion to 
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calibrated the owner’s control over the ancillary aspects of these monopolies by 
reference to this function and to a vaguely defined and non-exhaustive list of 
additional functions. The 2015 Directive has not revised or defined the protected 
functions that the CJEU has identified. In particular, it has not followed an initial 
recommendation that the core ground of infringement should protect only the 
essential function.19 This article will argue that the specification of the core exclusive 
right should address the distinct demand-side and supply-side monopolies separately 
and should address the ancillary aspects of these monopolies separately. Although the 
CJEU’s case law has generally achieved satisfactory outcomes in practice, it has taken 
an unnecessarily complex route to do this and has not provided a satisfactory 
explanation of some important features of the law.  
The article will proceed as follows. Section 2 will consider the economic goals of 
trade mark law, look more closely at how a trade mark contributes to these goals 
through its distinct demand-side and supply-side roles and consider the extent of 
protection that these roles require. Section 3 will review the specification of the core 
ground of infringement and the CJEU’s elaboration of it. Section 4 will evaluate this 
law’s protection of the demand-side role of trade marks. Section 5 will evaluate the 
law’s protection of the supply-side role of trade marks. Section 6 will draw some 
conclusions. 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
distinguish that product from products which have another origin”: Case C-102/77 Hoffmann-la Roche v 
Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139 at [7] ]; Case C-10/89 Cnl Sucal v Hag [1990] ECR I-3711 at [14]; Case C-
206/01 Arsenal FC plc v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 at [48]. 
19 European Commission, “Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council to 
approximate the Laws of the Member States relating to Trade Marks”, COM (2013) 162 final, 2013/ 
0089. 
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2. The Economic Role of the Trade Mark 
Monopolies 
As noted already, the CJEU views trade marks as essential to achieving a system of 
undistorted competition.20 They do this through enabling firms to brand products and 
differentiate them from others of the same kind, which turns them into specific objects 
of demand and facilitates their marketing and promotion to consumers. The 
exclusivity of the brand that a trade mark signifies along with its owner’s exclusive 
right to authorise products as branded products together give the brand the capacity 
to acquire a reputation, image and other associations based on the track record of 
branded products and on how they are marketed to consumers. Conferring a common 
identity on products that is exclusive to one firm gives them a history, a biography and 
a form of personality as well as establishing a basis for communication and 
commercial accountability.21 This may attract specific demand to the products for a 
number of reasons. The economic rationale of the trade mark system depends on 
ensuring that these reasons are consistent with undistorted competition.  
One important reason why a trade mark may attract specific demand to the 
brand of products that it signifies (hereafter “marked products”) is that it brands and 
differentiates products on the basis of their quality and other characteristics and gives 
consumers a reliable basis for developing and expressing their preferences in this 
                                                          
20 Case C-349/95 Loendersloot (Frits) v Ballantine [1997] ECR I-6227 at [22], citing the court’s 
judgments in Case C-10/89 Cnl Sucal v Hag [1990] ECR I-3711 at [13]; and Case C-427/93 Bristol-
Myers Squibb v Paranova  [1996] ECR I-3457at [43]. 
21 T. da Silva Lopes and M. Casson, “Entrepreneurship and the Development of Global Brands”, (2007) 
81 Business History Review 651-680 at 655-656. On the importance in the corporate context of a product 
having an institutional identity and personality of this kind, see J. Kahn, “Product Liability and the 
Politics of Corporate Presence: Identity and Accountability in Macpherson v. Buick” (2001) 35 Loyola of 
Los Angeles Law Review 3-64 at 30-41.  
11 
 
respect.22 The owner’s supply-side monopoly gives it the ability to ensure that marked 
products are and remain consistent with each other.23 A firm may be able to achieve 
and maintain a high level of consistency through the application of unique knowledge, 
skills and other capabilities that it has developed through experience.24 The owner’s 
capabilities in this respect may relate directly to production or to the management and 
orchestration of production through supply chains or other indirect arrangements. 
The fact that marked products are both clearly differentiated and likely to be 
consistent with each other means that a trade mark can be an efficient basis for 
communication and search. The owner, consumers and third parties can all use the 
trade mark to convey and acquire information about the marked products and 
consumers can use it to relate specific products on the market to their own experience. 
This reduces the need for specifying the quality and other characteristics of a product 
in precise detail, assuming this were to be possible. 
                                                          
22 On this as a form of competition, see L. Abbott, Quality and Competition: An Essay in Economic 
Theory (New York: Columbia University Press, 1955). On product quality and its positive and negative 
aspects, see J.M. Juran, Juran’s Quality Control Handbook (New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 1988) at 2-3. 
See also D.A. Garvin, “What does ‘Product Quality’ really mean?”, (1984) 26 Sloan Management Review 
25-43; C.A. Reeves and D.A. Bednar, “Defining Quality: Alternatives and Implications”, (1994) 19 
Academy of Management Review 419-445 at 424-425. 
23 A trade mark owner is not obliged to maintain the consistency of the marked products, which is why 
the “guarantee” of quality often attributed to trade marks is economic rather than legal in nature: Bostitch 
Trade Mark [1963] RPC 183 at 197; Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 at [38].  
24 On the value of “tacit” knowledge and skills, see M. Polanyi, Personal Knowledge: Towards a Post-
Critical Philosophy (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962) (corrected edition) at 49-65. On organisational 
“capabilities”, see G.B. Richardson, “The Organisation of Industry”, (1972) 82 Economic Journal 883-
896; R. N. Langlois, “Modularity in Technology and Organization”, (2002) 49 Journal of Economic 
Behaviour and Organization 19-37. 
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A further and related reason why a trade mark may attract specific demand to 
marked products is the commercial accountability that it establishes and signifies.25 
This not only increases the trade mark’s value as a reference point, but also can be a 
source of reassurance to consumers about quality and other matters to which they 
attach importance. A trade mark can do this through acquiring a good reputation and 
through signalling its owner’s stake in maintaining or increasing its appeal to 
consumers.26 This can be an efficient way of mitigating the potential problems that 
arise when consumers lack complete information about the quality of products on the 
market (or about other matters to which they attach significance) and face a 
significant risk of disappointment.27 Without a reliable means of mitigating these 
problems, the costs of obtaining the necessary information and any remaining risk of 
disappointment could be high and would then inhibit and distort competition based 
on product quality. The owner’s supply-side monopoly enables it to control and vouch 
for the quality of the marked products. It also maximises the owner’s incentive to use 
its control to maintain or improve the trade mark’s power to attract specific demand. 
                                                          
25 A trade mark has been described as a “banner” or “aegis” of commercial responsibility for the marked 
products: Aristoc v Rysta [1945] AC 68 (HL) at 101-102 (per Lord Wright); Glaxo Group v Dowelhurst 
[2000] FSR 529 (HC) at 540-541 (per Laddie J); Scandecor Development v Scandecor Marketing [2001] 
UKHL 21 at [19] (per Lord Nicholls). 
26 A. Katz, “Beyond Search Costs: The Linguistic and Trust Functions of Trademarks”, (2011) 5 Brigham 
Young University Law Review 1555-1608. See also A.P. Griffiths, “Trade Marks and Quality Assurance” 
in G. Dinwoodie (ed), Methods and Perspectives in Intellectual Property (Edward Elgar, 2013)) 129-150; 
A.P. Griffiths, “Brands, Firms and Competition” in I. Lianos et al (ed), Brands, Competition Law and IP 
(CUP, 2015) 238-260. 
27 G. Akerlof, “The Market for ‘Lemons’: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism”, (1970) 84 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 488-500; W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, “Trademark Law: An 
Economic Perspective”, (1987) 30 Journal of Law and Economics 265-309; N. Economides, “The 
Economics of Trademarks”, (1988) 78 Trademark Reporter 523-539; S.L. Dogan and M.A. Lemley, 
“Trademark and Consumer Search Costs on the Internet”, (2004) 41 Houston Law Review 777-838. 
13 
 
Product differentiation achieved through trade marks along with the availability of the 
trade marks as communication devices and sources of reassurance together increase 
the ability of consumers to base their purchasing decisions on information and trust 
rather than on direct inspection and verification. This facility has become even more 
valuable in the digital age where consumers have much greater access to information 
about products on the market and much less opportunity to inspect them prior to 
purchase. With on-line searching and shopping, consumers can acquire information, 
obtain reassurance and conclude transactions entirely through relying on trade marks. 
A trade mark’s capacity to attract specific demand for the above reasons is 
likely to increase as it becomes familiar to consumers and gains a presence in their 
minds. Familiarity enables a trade mark to perform its demand-side operational 
functions more effectively.28 A familiar trade mark has much greater value as a source 
of reassurance about product quality and other matters to which consumers attach 
significance. Through a ratchet-like effect, as a trade mark’s value and capacity to 
command premium prices increases to reflect its effectiveness at attracting specific 
demand, so its capacity to provide reassurance increases because of the greater value 
it has as a stake against the risk of disappointment.29  A trade mark with an enhanced 
capacity of this kind also has the potential to mitigate the risks associated with 
product development, product improvement and other forms of innovation. Whilst 
                                                          
28 The familiarity of a trade mark can speed the acquisition and processing of information that uses it as a 
reference point and facilitate rapid decision-making. Economic analysts have suggested that this 
constitutes a distinct capacity to reduce consumers’ “mental search costs” or “imagination costs”: see 
W.M. Landes and R.A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Intellectual Property Law (The Belknap Press, 
2003) at 161 and 207. For a critical appraisal of this view, see R. Tushnet, “Gone in Sixty Milliseconds: 
Trademark Law and Cognitive Science”, (2008) 86 Texas Law Review 507-568.Tushnet, 2008. 
29 B. Klein and K.B. Leffler, “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance”, (1981) 
89 Journal of Political Economy 615-641 at 629-633; C. Shapiro, “Consumer Information, Product 
Quality and Seller Reputation”, (1982) 13 Bell Journal of Economics 20-35; C. Shapiro, “Premiums for 
High Quality Products as Returns to Reputations”, (1983) 98 Quarterly Journal of Economics 659-679. 
14 
 
innovation can increase the risk of deficiencies and other sources of disappointment, a 
familiar trade mark can be an efficient means of alerting consumers to potential 
problems and provide additional reassurance through linking marked products to a 
good track record concerning responses to setbacks and mistakes.30 A familiar trade 
mark provides a useful reference point that can be used to publicise action designed 
to restore consumers’ trust in it as a source of guidance and reassurance and this 
may even strengthen that trust.  
A familiar trade mark can also attract specific demand for reasons that are not 
necessarily consistent with undistorted competition.31 It may do so simply because it 
provides consumers with a convenient reference point that they can use to shorten 
complex and burdensome decision-making.32 This cognitive availability is not 
necessarily a problem because it increases a trade mark’s vulnerability to bad 
publicity and therefore the reassurance that it can provide as a stake against the risk 
of disappointment. However, a familiar trade may also attract specific demand because 
of its emotional impact.33 Thus, along with matters such as design and presentation, a 
trade mark may contribute to the aesthetic and emotional appeal of marked 
                                                          
30 For examples of this, see N.F. Koehn, Brand New: How Entrepreneurs Earned Consumers’ Trust from 
Wedgwood to Dell (Harvard Business School Press, 2001) at 321-326. 
31 J. Davis and S.M. Maniatis, “Trademarks, Brands, and Competition” in T. da Silva Lopes and P. 
Duguid (eds), Trademarks, Brands, and Competitiveness (Routledge, 2013) (paperback edition) 119-137. 
32 A. Ehrenberg, N. Barnard and J. Scriven, “Differentiation or Salience”, (1997) 37 Journal of 
Advertising Research 7-14; G.B. Ramello, “What’s In a Sign? Trademark Law and Economic Theory” 
(2006) 20 Journal of Economic Surveys 547-565 at 556-559.   
33 J. Litman, “Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age”, (1999) 108 Yale Law 
Journal 1717-1735; D.A. Aaker and E. Joachimsthaler, Brand Leadership: The Next Level of the Brand 
Revolution (The Free Press, 2000) at 48-49; N.F. Koehn, Brand New: How Entrepreneurs Earned 
Consumers’ Trust from Wedgwood to Dell (Harvard Business School Press, 2001) at 307-339; J.B. 
Swann, D.A. Aaker and M. Reback, “Trademarks and Marketing”, (2001) 91 Trademark Reporter 787-
832 at 796-797. 
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products.34 It may do this directly through its inherent aesthetic appeal as a sign or 
through its aptness as a signifier for products of the relevant kind.35 It may do this 
indirectly through linking marked products to an image and other associations that 
the owner has cultivated through advertising and promotional activity. In this way, a 
trade mark can contribute to an intangible form of product branding and 
differentiation that appeals to consumers at the emotional and psychological level and 
reflects the growth of “consumerism” over the twentieth century.36  
Branding that has an emotional impact can influence consumers’ decision-
making in various ways and may even help to shape their impressions of other forms 
of quality.37 However, its social value as an object of effort and investment is 
questionable.38 It is also debatable whether the emotional appeal that a trade mark 
                                                          
34 On aesthetic and intangible quality as dimensions of quality, see D.A. Garvin, “Competing on the Eight 
Dimensions of Quality”, (1987) 65 Harvard Business Review 101-109. 
35 See,  for example, one journalist’s account of the emotional appeal of Nurofen’s chevron and target 
design: W. Leith, “Confessions of a ten-a-day man”, The Guardian, April 26 2003, available on-line at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/society/2003/apr/26/health.healthandwellbeing (accessed March 2017).  
36 For overviews of this trend, see E. Howker and S. Malik, Jilted Generation: How Britain has 
Bankrupted its Youth (Icon Books, 2013) (2nd. ed.) at 204-212; W. Streeck, “Citizens as Consumers: 
Considerations on the New Politics of Consumption”, (2012) 76 New Left Review 27-47 at 28-36. For 
sceptical views of consumerism, see A. Offer, “The Mask of Intimacy: Advertising and the Quality of 
Life”, in A. Offer, The Challenge of Affluence: Self-Control and Well-Being in the United States and 
Britain since 1950 (Oxford University Press, 2006) at 103-137; Z. Bauman, Consuming Life (Polity Press, 
2007) at 31. For more positive views, see C. Campbell, The Romantic Ethic and the Spirit of Modern 
Consumerism (Blackwell, 1987); C. Dyhouse, Glamour: Women, History, Feminism (Zed Books, 2011). 
37 J.J. Wheatley and J.S.Y. Chiu, “The Effects of Price, Store Image, and Product and Respondent 
Characteristics on Perceptions of Quality”, (1977) 14 Journal of Marketing Research 181-186;  
38 R. Brown, “Advertising and the Public Interest: Legal Protection of Trade Symbols”, (1948) 57 Yale 
Law Journal 1165-1206 at 1169; G.B. Ramello and F. Silva, “Appropriating Signs and Meaning: The 
Elusive Economics of Trademark”, (2006) 15 Industrial and Corporate Change 937-963 at 946-949; D.S. 
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may acquire reinforces or undermines the positive contributions that it can make to 
promoting socially-valuable forms of competition.39 On the one hand, emotional appeal 
can make a trade mark more vulnerable to bad publicity and therefore more valuable 
as a source of reassurance.40 On the other hand, it may give its owner a significant 
competitive advantage and even strategic power within a value chain. One reason for 
this is that its owner can use such a trade mark to add substantial intangible value to 
marked products at a relatively low marginal cost. Moreover, the emotional desires to 
which it caters may prove hard for consumers to satisfy and it may attract further 
demand for this reason.41  
Whatever the reasons behind it, a trade mark’s capacity to attract specific 
demand rests on the two complementary monopolies that its owner enjoys. The 
owner’s demand-side monopoly reflects its exclusive right to use the relevant sign to 
brand certain products of the relevant kind in order to signify their common 
commercial origin and to differentiate them clearly from other products of the same 
kind (referred to hereafter as “proprietary use” of the sign).42 It is therefore essential 
that relevant consumers can readily recognise the trade mark as the signifier of an 
exclusive connection between the marked products and one firm in particular.43 This 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Gangjee, “Property in Brands”, in H.R. Howe and J. Griffiths, Property Concepts in Intellectual Property 
Law (CUP, 2013) 29-59. 
39 J. Davis and S.M. Maniatis, “Trademarks, Brands, and Competition” in T. da Silva Lopes and P. 
Duguid (eds), Trademarks, Brands, and Competitiveness (Routledge, 2013) (paperback edition) 119-137. 
40 B. Klein and K.B. Leffler, “The Role of Market Forces in Assuring Contractual Performance”, (1981) 
89 Journal of Political Economy 615-641 at 629-633. 
41 Z. Bauman, Consuming Life (Polity Press, 2007) at 31. 
42 On using the terms “proprietary” use and “referential” use in this context, see D.W. Barnes, 
“Trademark Externalities”, (2007) 10 Yale Journal of Law & Technology 1-44. 
43 The CJEU has identified this as a key aspect of a trade mark’s “essential function”: Case C-102/77 
Hoffmann-la Roche v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139 at [7] ]; Case C-10/89 Cnl Sucal v Hag [1990] ECR 
I-3711 at [14]; Case C-206/01 Arsenal FC plc v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 at [48]. 
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also enables the trade mark to signify commercial accountability for the marked 
products and transmit its messages of likely consistency and reassurance based on 
their common commercial origin. The exclusivity of its owner’s right to make 
proprietary use of the relevant sign is therefore necessary since the trade mark would 
not otherwise differentiate marked products from others of the same kind on this basis 
or at least would not do so with the requisite degree of clarity.44  
However, to ensure that the owner’s demand-side monopoly does not give it an 
unfair competitive advantage, trade mark law must restrict the kind of signs that firms 
can register for this purpose. It does this through the absolute grounds for refusal that 
prevent firms from registering signs that consumers are unlikely to perceive as trade 
marks, signs that would attract demand for ulterior reasons and other signs that 
would give a firm an unfair advantage in the circumstances.45 Moreover, the demand-
side monopoly needs to cover only proprietary use of the relevant sign or at least use 
in a way that relevant consumers are likely to perceive as contributing to the overall 
branding of products of the relevant kind. In other words, the capacity to perform this 
operational function does not require a broader monopoly that covers any appearance 
of the relevant sign on products of the relevant kind or in communication concerning 
products of the relevant kind.  
A trade mark’s capacity to perform its ancillary demand-side operational 
functions of attracting and soliciting and reeling in specific demand to marked 
products should reflect and reinforce the exclusivity that is necessary for the owner to 
make proprietary use of the relevant sign. The relevant sign should acquire a special 
meaning as a trade mark and thereby provide a means of referring to marked products 
                                                          
44 There is an exception to this absolute right in cases of honest concurrent use: Budejovicky Budvar 
Narodni v Anheuser-Busch [2012] EWCA Civ 880. 
45 Directive, art. 3(1); 2015 Directive, art. 4(1). On the role of the absolute ground for refusal covering 
bad faith in combatting unfair competition in this respect, see N.M. Dawson, “Bad Faith in European 
Trade Mark Law”, [2011] IPQ 229-258. 
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in communication of various kinds. Its owner therefore requires sufficient control to 
ensure that third parties selling, supplying or marketing products of the relevant kind  
respect this special meaning when they use the relevant sign referentially. This control 
should also cover how third parties respond to consumers when they make referential 
use of the sign in their searches, requests or enquiries. As long as the owner has this 
minimum level of control, there is a good case for entitling third parties to make 
referential use of the relevant sign in comparative advertising and other promotional 
activity so that they can compete more effectively and in particular so that they can 
challenge established market leaders.46 Third parties would then be free to promote 
alternatives to marked products and to alert consumers to the availability of 
alternatives.   
Third parties should also have some latitude as to how they respond to 
consumers’ referential use of a trade mark in searches, requests and enquiries, 
especially where the trade mark has gained a high level of recognition. Third parties 
should be entitled to check the true intention of consumers in using the relevant sign, 
to alert them to alternatives and to seek to persuade them to switch their demand. 
However, third parties doing this should make it clear to consumers what they are 
doing and in particular that the alternatives have a different commercial origin. 
Without third parties having some latitude along these lines, the owner of a familiar 
trade mark could be left free to enjoy excessive market power.  
As regards the supply-side monopoly, this ensures the owner’s practical 
control over marked products. It gives the owner sufficient control to ensure that 
marked products are not just products “of one undertaking”, but have the specific 
combination of quality, features and other characteristics that the owner intends this 
                                                          
46 See the preamble to Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and comparative advertising 
(codified version) at Recital (13): “It may, however, be indispensable in order to make comparative 
advertising effective, to identify the goods or services of a competitor, making reference to a trade mark 
or trade name of which the latter is proprietor”. 
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particular brand of products to have. This supply-side control is an essential 
complement to the trade mark’s demand-side roles as a means of product 
differentiation and as source of information and reassurance about product quality 
and characteristics. The supply-side monopoly secures the owner’s ability to accept 
commercial responsibility for marked products through giving the owner control over 
the track record on which the trade mark’s reputation is based. It also ensures the 
unitary control over marked products that gives a trade mark the capacity to acquire a 
form of personality with an image and other associations.  
Where the marked products are goods, the owner requires some ancillary 
control over the further marketing of marked products downstream. In principle, this 
ancillary control  should reinforce the absolute control the owner has at the point of 
first marketing and protect its economic significance. In particular, the owner should 
have sufficient ancillary control over the use of its trade mark for further marketing to 
ensure that goods cannot be marketed as marked goods if their condition, quality or 
other characteristics are likely to damage the trade mark’s reliability as a basis of 
communication and source of reassurance. In other words, the owner should be 
entitled to prevent marked goods from being further marketed under the trade mark in 
circumstances that are likely to undermine the commercial accountability that use of 
the trade mark is supposed to establish and signify. Subject to the owner having this 
minimum level of ancillary control over downstream movement, there is a good case 
for entitling third parties to use the trade mark for the further marketing of marked 
goods, especially since the owner should have already secured an economic return 
from the trade mark’s capacity to attract specific demand to these particular goods.  
This would help to promote downstream or “intra-brand” competition and curb the 
scope that the owner would otherwise have for territorial and other forms of price 
discrimination.47  
                                                          
47 On territorial and other forms of price discrimination in this context, see R. Schmalensee, “Output and 
Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price Discrimination”, (1981) 71 American 
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It is arguable that the owner’s ancillary supply-side control over the use of its 
trade mark downstream should cover all matters over which the owner has control at 
the point of first marketing that contribute to the trade mark’s capacity to attract 
specific demand. On this basis, the owner should be entitled to protect all aspects of 
the trade mark’s image and any other associations that it has acquired as well as its 
reputation concerning product quality and characteristics. Insofar as this would 
protect the trade mark’s capacity to attract specific demand through increasing the 
emotional appeal of marked products, the case is a debatable one. However, there is a 
much stronger case for extending the owner’s ancillary control downstream to include 
standards of business behaviour where these are matters that the owner seeks to 
control upstream and to vouch for through the trade mark.48  This would strengthen 
the incentive that trade marks provide for firms to cultivate a good reputation in this 
respect and the extension would have more obvious social value. 
 
3. The Specification and Elaboration of the Core 
Ground of Infringement 
                                                                                                                                                                          
Economic Review 242-247; K.E. Maskus, “Economic Perspectives on Exhaustion and Parallel Imports”, 
in I. Calboli and E. Lee (eds), Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Exhaustion and Parallel 
Imports (Edward Elgar, 2016) 106-124 at 112-113.  
48 On the potential role of trade marks and brands in promoting corporate social responsibility, see A.P. 
Griffiths, “Trade Marks and Responsible Capitalism”, (2012) 43 International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law 798-824; M. Chon, “Slow Logo: Brand Citizenship in Global Value 
Networks”, (2014) 47 UC Davis Law Review 935-968; M. Chon, “Trademark Goodwill as a Public Good: 
Brands and Innovations in Corporate Social Responsibility”, forthcoming in (2017) 21 Lewis & Clark 
Law Review, also available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2870029 (accessed 
March 2017). 
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The Directive and the 2015 Directive specify the exclusive rights that an applicant 
acquires through registering a sign as a trade mark in the form of three grounds of 
infringement.49 The first of these grounds (“the core ground”) entitles the owner of a 
trade mark:  
“to prevent all third parties not having consent from using in the course of 
trade, in relation to goods or services, where: (a) the sign is identical with the 
trade mark and is used in relation to goods or services which are identical with 
those for which the trade mark is registered”.50 
The preambles to both directives state that the protection afforded by the registered 
trade mark “should be absolute in the event of there being identity between the mark 
and the corresponding sign and the goods or services”.51 However, the relevant recitals 
qualify this statement by noting that the function of the protection “is in particular to 
guarantee the trade mark as an indication of origin”.52 This qualification adds weight 
to the view that the core ground should limit the owner’s control along the lines 
discussed in section 2 of this article. 
The Court of Appeal has summarised the CJEU’s elaboration of the core 
ground of infringement as requiring the owner to satisfy six conditions:53 (i) there must 
                                                          
49 Directive, art. 5(1) & 5(2); 2015 Directive, art. 12(2). 
50 2015 Directive, art. 12(2)(a); Directive, art. 5(1)(a). 
51 2015 Directive, recital (16); Directive, recital (11). 
52 2015 Directive, recital (16); Directive, recital (11). 
53 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2014] EWCA Civ 1403 at [67). See also the judgments of Arnold J in 
Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2013] EWHC 1291 (Ch) at [177]; and Supreme Petfoods v Henry Bell 
[2015] EWHC 256 (Civ) at [83]. See further Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-
10273 at [51]; Case C-245/02 Anheuser-Busch v Budejovicky Budvar [2004] ECR I-10989 at [59]; Case 
C-48/05 Adam Opel v Autec [2007] ECR I-1017 at [18]-[22]; Case C-17/06 Céline v Céline [2007] ECR 
I-7401 at [16]; Case C-62/08 UDV North America v Brandtraders [2009] ECR I-1279 at [42]; Case C-
487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185 at [58]-[64]. 
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be use of a sign by a third party within the relevant territory; (ii) the use must be in 
the course of trade; (iii) it must be without the consent of the proprietor of the trade 
mark; (iv) it must be of a sign which is identical to the trade mark; (v) it must be in 
relation to goods or services which are identical to those for which the trade mark is 
registered; and (vi) it must affect or be liable to affect one of the functions of the trade 
mark. For convenience, this article will use this scheme of numeration. In applying 
these conditions, the CJEU has ruled that a court or other tribunal should not focus 
on the sign that a third party is using in isolation and devoid of context, but should 
take account of the particular context of the third party’s use.54 On this basis, these 
conditions can be viewed as an adaptation of the conditions of the core relative ground 
for refusal to the much wider range of circumstances in which a third party may be 
using a sign that is identical to a trade mark.55 
 
Conditions (i) – (v) of the Core Ground of Infringement 
These conditions reflect the Directive’s specification of the core ground. The CJEU has 
provided significant guidance on condition (ii), which is the main qualifying factor in 
the Directive’s specification. The CJEU has ruled that use “in the course of trade” 
means that the third party’s use should take place “in the context of commercial 
activity with a view to economic advantage and not as a private matter”.56 This means 
                                                          
54 Case C-533/06 O2 Holdings v Hutchison 3G [2008] ECR I-4231at [64]; Case C-46/10 Viking Gas v 
Kosan Gas (C-46/10) [2011] ETMR 58 (WL) at [39]-[41]; Case C-252/12 Specsavers v Asda [2013] Bus 
LR 1277 at [45] . 
55 The CJEU has treated the relative grounds for refusal as “conceptually indistinguishable” from the 
corresponding grounds of infringement.Case C-39/97 Canon  v MGM [1998] ECR I-5507 at [16]; Case 
291/00 LTJ Diffusion v Sadas [2003] ECR I-2799 at [43]. 
56 Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 at [40]; Case C-245/02 Anheuser-
Busch v Budejovicky Budvar [2004] ECR I-10989 at [62];Case C-17/06 Céline v Céline [2007] ECR I-
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that the third party must usually be an economic operator in the business of selling, 
supplying or marketing products of the relevant kind rather than as a private 
individual.57 However, the CJEU has also required that the third party should be 
using the relevant sign “in its own commercial communication”.58 This means that the 
relevant sign should form part of the presentation or commercial identity of the 
products that the third party is selling, supplying or marketing or that the sign should 
feature in the third party’s advertising, promotional activity or other communication 
with consumers concerning products of the relevant kind. The CJEU’s elaboration of 
condition (ii) therefore means that the core ground does not give the owner of a trade 
mark a broad monopoly covering any commercial activity in which the relevant sign 
features and in which a third party can be viewed as profiting from the owner’s 
investment in building up the value and appeal of the trade mark. The core ground is 
focused more narrowly on circumstances in which the relevant sign features in the 
presentation or branding of products of the relevant kind or in communication with 
consumers related to the sale, supply or marketing of products of this kind.  
As regards condition (iii), lack of consent is specified as an overriding 
requirement for all three grounds of infringement and emphasises the exclusive nature 
of a trade mark as a resource for attracting specific demand. This condition also 
reinforces the owner’s supply-side monopoly and the contribution that the trade mark 
has made to business structures and organisation. The issues that condition (iii) may 
raise are conceptually similar to other supply-side issues such as those concerning 
the use of the trade mark for the further marketing of marked goods and the extent of 
a trade mark owner’s ancillary control over the use of its trade mark (both proprietary 
and referential) in the context of further marketing. Section 5 will address these 
supply-side issues. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
7401 at [17]; Case C-62/08 UDV North America v Brandtraders [2009] ECR I-1279 at [42]; Case C-
487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185 at [57]-[58]. 
57 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v eBay [2012] Bus LR 1369 at [54]-[55]. 
58 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 [55]-[57]. 
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Conditions (iv) and (v) of the core ground reflect the “double identity” 
requirements of the core relative ground for refusal and the case law on that relative 
ground provides some guidance on these conditions.59 However, infringement can 
raise additional issues that do not arise in the context of registration and these two 
conditions have required some refinement to address these issues. In the case of 
condition (iv), it may not be easy to determine the particular sign that the third party 
is using.60 In the case of condition (v), it may not be easy to determine the particular 
kind of products “in relation to” which the third party is using its sign. The CJEU has 
ruled that a third party is usually using a sign “in relation to” the particular products 
that it is selling, supplying or marketing and therefore in relation to products of this 
generic kind61 Nevertheless, the CJEU has accepted there can be exceptions to this 
general rule.62  
The CJEU’s specification of condition (v) in the context of infringement 
suggests that it may go further than requiring “double identity” in the case of a third 
party’s use of a particular sign in relation to products of a particular kind and raise an 
additional issue concerning the nature of the third party’s use of its sign. This aspect 
of condition (v) appears to operate as an additional limit on the overall scope of the 
                                                          
59 Case 291/00 LTJ Diffusion v Sadas [2003] ECR I-2799. See, for example, A.P. Griffiths, “The Trade 
Mark Monopoly: An Analysis of the Core Zone of Absolute Protection”, [2007] IPQ312-349. 
60 See, for example, Reed Executive v Reed Business [2004] EWCA Civ 159; Ellerman v C-Vanci [2006] 
EWHC 1442; Miss World v Channel 4 TV [2007] EWHC 982; Nude Brands v Stella McCartney [2009] 
EWHC 2154; Och-Ziff v OCH Capital [2010] EWHC 2599. 
61 Case C-48/05 Adam Opel v Autec [2007] ECR I-1017 at [28]-[29]; Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google 
France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 at [60]. These may be products that the third party is selling, 
supplying or marketing on its own part or products that it is selling, supplying or marketing on behalf of 
another party: Case C-62/08 UDV North America v Brandtraders [2009] ECR I-1279 at [43]; Case C-
324/09 L’Oréal v eBay [2012] Bus LR 1369 at [91]. 
62 Case C-63/97 BMW v Deenik [1999] ECR I-905 at [39]; Case C-48/05 Adam Opel v Autec [2007] ECR 
I-1017 at [27]-[28]. 
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core ground between conditions (ii) and (vi). This apparent aspect of condition (v) adds 
unnecessary complexity to the specification of core ground, especially since the CJEU 
has not provided a clear definition of the limitation or explained how it relates to 
condition (vi).63 The basis for this view is the provision in the Directive that lists a 
number of ways in which a third party may infringe a trade mark, these including 
“affixing the sign to goods or their packaging” and using the sign “in advertising”.64 
The CJEU has ruled that these all constitute use of the sign “in relation to” products 
for the purposes of condition (v).65 The CJEU has also ruled that this list is non-
exhaustive and that using a sign “in relation to” products includes forms of marketing 
and communication that were not current at the time of the Directive.  It has 
confirmed, for example, that there is use of a sign in relation to products where a third 
party uses the sign as a keyword to influence on-line search results or to trigger on-
line advertising even where the sign does not appear in a triggered advertisement or 
website.66  
                                                          
63 See Arnold J’s criticism of the CJEU’s lack of consistency on this point: Supreme Petfoods v Henry 
Bell [2015] EWHC 256 (Civ) at [85]. 
64 “The following, inter alia, may be prohibited under paragraphs 1 and 2: (a) affixing the sign to the goods 
or to the packaging thereof; (b) offering the goods, or putting them on the market or stocking them for these 
purposes under that sign, or offering or supplying services thereunder; (c) importing or exporting the goods 
under the sign; (d) using the sign on business papers and in advertising”: the Directive, article 5(3). In the 
2015 Directive, the equivalent provision includes two additional items, namely “(d) using the sign as a trade 
or company name or part of a trade or company name” (with the previous item in (d) now appearing as (e); 
and “(f) using the sign in comparative advertising in a manner that is contrary to Directive 2006/114/EC”: the 
2015 Directive, art. 10(3). 
65 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 at [61], citing Case C-
206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 at [41]; and Case C-48/05 Adam Opel v Autec 
[2007] ECR I-1017 at [20]. 
66 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 at [62]-[73]. 
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The CJEU’s expansive and flexible conception of “use in relation to” products 
appears to leave little room for condition (v) to operate as an additional filtering device. 
Nevertheless, the CJEU has treated it as being one and has ruled that this aspect of 
condition (v) is satisfied where a third party uses a sign in such a way that “a link is 
established” between the sign and the products that the third party is selling, 
supplying or marketing.67 This appears to cover both the presence of the relevant sign 
on a third party’s products and its appearance in communication between a third 
party and consumers concerning products of the relevant kind.68  
 
Condition (vi) of the Core Ground of Infringement 
Condition (vi) is the condition that the CJEU has added to the specification of the core 
ground in the Directive. It requires that a third party’s use of a sign that satisfies 
conditions (i) to (v) must also be liable to affect one of the functions of the trade mark, 
which the CJEU at first described simply as including “in particular its essential 
function of guaranteeing to consumers the origin of the goods”.69 The court 
subsequently confirmed that they also include “other functions”, mentioning “in 
particular that of guaranteeing the quality of the goods or services in question and 
those of communication, investment or advertising”.70 The CJEU has used this 
                                                          
67 Case C-17/06 Céline v Céline [2007] ECR I-7401 at [22]-[23]; Case C-62/08 UDV North America v 
Brandtraders [2009] ECR I-1279 at [47]; Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] 
ECR I-2417 at [72]; Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v eBay [2012] Bus LR 1369 at [92]-[93]. The 2015 Directive 
lists “using the sign as a trade or company name or part of a trade or company name” as an example of 
infringing use. This appears to override the CJEU’s judgment in Céline v Céline so that such use counts as 
infringement regardless of whether consumers are likely to perceive the necessary “link” between the 
name and the products that the third party is selling, supplying or marketing: 2015 Directive, art. 10(3)(d). 
68 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v eBay [2012] Bus LR 1369 at [AG89] and [93]. 
69 Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273at [51]. 
70 Case C-487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185 at [58].  
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condition to calibrate the control that the core ground gives the owners of trade marks 
along the lines discussed in section 2. However, it has taken a circuitous legal route to 
do this and there are some shortcomings. 
Condition (vi) has proved to be complicated and controversial. Ideally, it would 
address the demand-side and supply-side roles of a trade mark separately. It would 
also draw a clear line between protecting the owner’s absolute right to make 
proprietary use of the sign and securing the qualified ancillary control that the owner 
needs over referential use of its trade mark so that it can perform its ancillary 
demand-side functions effectively. The functions that the CJEU has identified in 
condition (vi) do not readily correspond to the various operational functions discussed 
in section 2. The CJEU elaborated condition (vi) in Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed.71 This 
case involved the presence of the relevant sign in question on products of the relevant 
kind. The CJEU confirmed that the core ground does not give the owner absolute 
control over the sale, supply or marketing of products on which the relevant sign 
appears. Instead, the “absolute” nature of the protection that the owner enjoys under 
core ground should reflect the economic objectives of the Directive and merely be 
sufficient “to ensure that the trade mark can fulfil its functions”.72 
In the Arsenal FC case, the CJEU focused on the trade mark’s “essential” 
function and its description of this function encompasses both the demand-side and 
supply-side monopolies.73 The protection of this function provides a basis for securing 
                                                          
71 Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273. The CJEU had anticipated this 
development in an earlier judgment. It had held that a third party had had not infringed two trade marks 
under the core ground because the third party’s use of the relevant signs had not infringed “any of the 
interests which [the ground of infringement] is intended to protect”: Case C-2/00 Hölterhoff v Freiesleben 
[2002] ECR I-4187 at [16]-[17]. 
72 Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 at [51]. 
73 The CJEU described the essential function as being to “guarantee the identity of the origin of the trade-
marked product to the consumer or ultimate user, by enabling him without any possibility of confusion to 
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these monopolies and indicates how each of them should be calibrated. In particular, 
on the demand side, the Arsenal FC judgment confirmed that the owner’s absolute 
right should be limited to situations in which relevant consumers would be likely to 
perceive a third party’s use of the relevant sign on products of the relevant kind or 
communication concerning products of this kind as proprietary in nature. On the 
supply side, the CJEU linked the protection of a trade mark’s essential function to the 
owner’s exclusive right to determine which products of the relevant kind could be 
marketed as marked products and thereby to determine the products for which it was 
willing to accept commercial responsibility in respect of quality.74 The CJEU in fact 
drew its description of the essential function of a trade mark from judgments it had 
given concerning the owner’s supply-side monopoly and the owner’s ancillary control 
over the further marketing of marked goods.75 However, the CJEU has not addressed 
the supply-side monopoly directly and separately in its development of condition (vi). 
When the CJEU further elaborated condition (vi) in L’Oréal v Bellure,76 the 
CJEU indicated that a third party’s referential use of a trade mark in advertising 
                                                                                                                                                                          
distinguish that product from products which have another origin”: Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew 
Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 at [48]. 
74 Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 at [48]. 
75 Case C-102/77 Hoffmann-la Roche v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139 at [7]. See also Case C-10/89 Cnl 
Sucal v Hag [1990] ECR I-3711 at [14]; Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 at [38]-
[39]; Case C-427/93 Bristol-Myers Squibb v Paranova  [1996] ECR I-3457at [43]; Case C-349/95 
Loendersloot (Frits) v Ballantine [1997] ECR I-6227 at [22]. 
76 Case C-487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185 at [58]. See also Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google 
France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 at [77]; Case C-278/08 Die BergSpechte v Günter Guni 
[2010] ECR I-2517 at [31]; Case C-558/08 Portakabin v Primakabin [2010] ECR I-6963 at [30]; Case C-
323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440 at [38]; Case C-482/09 Budejovicky Budvar v 
Anheuser-Busch [2012] Bus LR 298 at [71].This specification of the additional functions can be found in 
the opinion of AG Jacobs in  Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior v Evora [1997] ECR I-6013 at 
[AG41]-[AG42]. See also C. Gielen, “Harmonisation of Trade Mark Law in Europe”, [1992] EIPR 262-
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would ipso facto be liable to affect one of the additional protected functions of a trade 
mark that it identified in that case.77 The immediate practical effect of this was to shift 
the legal basis for calibrating the extent of the owner’s control in this context onto the 
defences available to third parties and to ensure that the owner could enforce the 
terms of that calibration directly against third parties.78  In particular, the CJEU 
ensured that the owner in L’Oréal v Bellure had sufficient control over referential use 
of its trade marks in comparative advertising to enforce the conditions of the 
Misleading and Comparative Advertising Directive (“MCAD”) against the third parties 
in that case.79 However, condition (vi) is a general condition and the CJEU’s 
elaboration of it to include additional functions has extended the control that trade 
mark owners have over use of the signs they have registered as trade marks generally 
and not just their control over referential use of their trade marks in advertising.  
Sections 4 and 5 will consider the implications of the elaboration of condition 
(vi) for the demand-side and supply-side roles of trade marks respectively. However, 
there are some initial observations to make here. In L’Oréal, the CJEU addressed the 
                                                                                                                                                                          
269; W. Cornish, Intellectual Property (3rd. ed.) (Sweet & Maxwell, 1996)) at 527-529.  
77 The national court would have to determine whether this was in fact the case: Case C-487/07 L’Oréal v 
Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185 at [63].  
78 For a survey of the different legal mechanisms that can be used to calibrate the exclusive rights of trade 
mark owners, see L.P. Ramsey and J. Schovsbo, “Mechanisms for Limiting Trade Mark Rights to Further 
Competition and Free Speech”, (2013) 44 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition 
Law 671-700. 
79 Directive 2006/114/EC concerning misleading and comparative advertising, which consolidated the 
advertising Directive 84/450/EC as amended by Directive 97/55/EC. The CJEU has subsequently treated the 
use of a trade mark in comparative advertising that does not comply with a condition of the MCAD as 
infringement of that trade mark although it did not explain the legal route to this finding: Case C-159/09 Lidl 
v Vierzon [2011] 2 CMLR 10 (WL). As noted above, the 2015 Directive now includes “using the sign in 
comparative advertising in a manner that is contrary to Directive 2006/114/EC” in its list of uses of a sign that 
may infringe a trade mark: the 2015 Directive, art. 10(3). 
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“communication, investment or advertising” functions together and did not specify 
which of them the third parties’ activity had been liable to affect. In subsequent cases, 
it has addressed the “advertising” and “investment” functions separately and has 
emphasised their distinction from each other. The CJEU has described the advertising 
function as the use of a trade mark “as a factor in sales promotion or as an 
instrument of commercial strategy”.80  It has described the investment function as the 
use of a trade mark “to acquire or preserve a reputation capable of attracting 
consumers and retaining their loyalty”.81 The CJEU has held that the latter function is 
distinct from the advertising function because where the owner uses its trade mark to 
acquire or preserve a reputation, “not only advertising is employed, but also various 
commercial techniques”.82  
The CJEU has explained its elaboration of condition (vi) as taking account of 
the fact that firms often use their trade marks to do more than perform their essential 
function of signifying an exclusive identify based on their commercial origin. A firm 
may also use a trade mark as “an instrument of commercial strategy” for, inter alia, 
“advertising purposes or to acquire a reputation in order to develop consumer 
loyalty”.83 The extension of the owner’s control should therefore enable it to protect the 
capacity of a trade mark to attract consumers in the various ways that section 2 has 
noted. This includes protecting an image and associations built up for the trade mark 
through advertising and other promotional activity that exerts emotional appeal to 
consumers or certain of them. The CJEU has been willing to treat activity that 
damages “the image” of a marked product as thereby damaging “the reputation of the 
trade mark”.84 However, the CJEU has ruled that there are no grounds for holding 
                                                          
80 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 at [92]. 
81 Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440 at [60]. 
82 Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440 at [61]. 
83 Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440 at [39]. 
84 Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v eBay [2012] Bus LR 1369 at [83]. The CJEU has also treated “the allure and 
prestigious image” of luxury goods “which bestows on them an aura of luxury” as contributing to the 
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that only trade marks with “a reputation” are capable of having functions in addition 
to their essential function.85 
The CJEU has recognised that not all trade marks perform the additional 
functions whereas all trade marks are supposed to perform the essential function.86 A 
trade mark only performs the additional functions if its owner uses it to that end.87 
This suggests that the elaboration of condition (vi) extends the owner’s control to 
enable it to protect any presence that it has gained in the minds of consumers, 
especially through investment in advertising and promotional activity. As section 2 
has noted, gaining a presence of this kind can increase the effectiveness of a trade 
mark as a reference point and communication device as well as its economic value. 
The elaboration of condition (vi) has therefore strengthened the scope for using trade 
marks to achieve product differentiation that extends to intangible characteristics 
based on emotional appeal despite the questionable social value of this kind of appeal 
and despite the argument that it may impede rather than promote competition. 
 
4. The Demand-Side Monopoly and Ancillary Control 
This section will consider how well the core ground of infringement protects the 
demand-side role of a trade mark. It has been seen how a trade mark may perform up 
to three operational functions as part of this role. The first of these is the trade mark’s 
capacity to confer a distinctive identity on certain products of the relevant kind (or to 
contribute to such an identity) and thereby brand them and differentiate them from 
others. Branding turns products into specific objects of demand and, as section 2 has 
                                                                                                                                                                          
“quality” of such goods and worthy of protection: Case C-59/08 Copad v Christian Dior Couture [2009] 
ECR I-3421 at [24]-[26]. 
85 Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440 at [39]. 
86 Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440 at [40]. 
87 Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440 at [40]. 
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shown, this may attract specific demand for a number of reasons. The two ancillary 
operational functions both involve referential use of the trade mark. One is to provide 
a reference point that the owner can use in advertising and promotional activity to 
solicit specific demand for the marked products. Here, the trade mark gives the owner 
a basis for communicating with consumers about the marked products through 
various media and for reaching a wide potential source of specific demand. The owner 
can also use the trade mark in this way to cultivate or strengthen a particular image 
and set of associations for the trade mark that it can confer onto the marked products. 
In effect, the trade mark becomes a means of adding an intangible form of quality to 
the marked products, which may have emotional appeal to consumers or a section of 
them. The other ancillary operational function applies where the trade mark signifies 
verbally. Such a trade mark gives consumers a basis for seeking and acquiring 
information about marked products and for expressing specific demand for them. 
From the owner’s perspective, such a trade mark provides a means of directing or 
“reeling in” specific demand from consumers to marked products. This function is 
especially important where consumers communicate with and obtain marked products 
from third party intermediaries rather than the owner. 
For a trade mark to be effective at these three operational functions, the owner 
needs various levels of control over how third parties selling, supplying or marketing 
products of the relevant kind use the relevant sign. To ensure the trade mark’s 
effectiveness as a means of branding products of the relevant kind, the owner needs 
an absolute right to prevent third parties from using the relevant sign in a way that 
relevant consumers may perceive as proprietary or as conveying information about the 
commercial origin of products of the relevant kind. The owner may also require some 
additional control to ensure the trade mark’s effectiveness at performing the ancillary 
operational functions, though the scope of this ancillary control is debatable. Any 
ancillary control would relate to how third parties use the relevant sign in their own 
advertising and in any other communication with consumers, including their response 
to consumers’ use of the relevant sign.  
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Protecting the Owner’s Exclusive Right to Make “Proprietary” Use of the 
Relevant Sign as a Trade Mark 
The CJEU has established that a third party is using the relevant sign “in relation to” 
particular products and may therefore satisfy condition (v) of the core ground of 
infringement in two broad situations. There first is where the sign appears on 
products that the third party is selling, supplying or marketing or on their packaging. 
The second is where the sign appears in material or some other kind of 
communication with consumers relating to products that the third party is selling, 
supplying or marketing. The CJEU has ruled that the third party should be using the 
sign in such a way that it establishes “a link” with the third party’s products.88 The 
second situation therefore covers a third party’s referential use of the relevant sign in 
advertising and promotional material and a third party’s response to consumers’ use 
the relevant sign in searches, requests and enquiries.89 This covers a wide range of 
possibilities. Without the further qualification achieved through condition (vi), the core 
ground would have given the owner a monopoly that extended far beyond the scope 
that the economic objectives of the trade mark system could justify. 
Condition (vi) has narrowed down the range of possibilities and limited the 
owner’s overall monopoly accordingly. Moreover, focusing this condition on the 
protection of the trade mark’s essential function in this context secures the owner’s 
exclusive right to make proprietary use of the relevant sign to brand products of the 
relevant kind. The CJEU’s initial formulation of condition (vi) in the Arsenal FC case 
                                                          
88 Case C-17/06 Céline v Céline [2007] ECR I-7401 at [22]-[23]. See also Merck v Merck Sharp and 
Dohme [2016] EWHC 49 at [165]. 
89 Case C-533/06 O2 Holdings v Hutchison 3G [2008] ECR I-4231 at [36] and [37]; Case C-487/07 
L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185 at [53]; Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton 
[2010] ECR I-2417 at [60]-[74]; Case C-278/08 Die BergSpechte v Günter Guni [2010] ECR I-2517 at 
[19]; Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440 at [31]. 
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therefore appeared to establish a satisfactory calibration of the owner’s demand-side 
monopoly.90 The CJEU made some further comments in that case to show how it 
would do this. The CJEU referred to the need for all products “bearing” or “designated” 
by the trade mark to have been manufactured or supplied under the control of its 
owner.91 The owner should therefore have an absolute right to prevent a third party 
from using the relevant sign in any way that amounts to “designating” (and in effect 
“branding”) products of the relevant kind or that involves products of the relevant kind 
“bearing” the relevant sign. Once it is established that the third party is doing this, 
then condition (vi) is satisfied and the owner’s absolute protection under the core 
ground is triggered. 
The CJEU’ has held that a third party’s use of the relevant sign is liable to 
affect a trade mark’s essential function in one of these ways if it creates the 
impression that there is “a material link in the course of trade” between the third 
party’s products and the trade mark’s owner.92 It has also held that it does so when 
relevant consumers are likely to perceive the third party’s use of the sign “as 
designating or tending to designate” the commercial origin of the third party’s 
products.93 Where the sign appears on the third party’s products, this includes 
                                                          
90 Case C-206/01 Arsenal FC plc v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 at [48]. 
91 Case C-206/01 Arsenal FC plc v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 at [48] and [58]. 
92 Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273at [56]. See also Case C-245/02 
Anheuser-Busch v Budejovicky Budvar [2004] ECR I-10989 at [60]; Case C-62/08 UDV North America v 
Brandtraders [2009] ECR I-1279 at [49]. 
93 Case C-245/02 Anheuser-Busch v Budejovicky Budvar [2004] ECR I-10989 at [60]; Case C-48/05 
Adam Opel v Autec [2007] ECR I-1017 at [23]. In Céline v Céline, the CJEU held that a third party’s use 
of the relevant sign as a business name would only satisfy condition (vi) if “consumers [would be] liable 
to interpret it as designating the origin of the goods or services in question”: Case C-17/06 Céline v 
Céline [2007] ECR I-7401 at [27]. However, the 2015 Directive now specifies, “using the sign as a trade 
or company name or part of a trade or company name” as an example of something that can be prohibited 
under the grounds of infringement: 2015 Directive, art. 10(3)(d). 
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consumers who may encounter them after the point of sale. A third party cannot 
therefore negate any impression that it is using the relevant sign to brand its products 
or to signify that they have an economic link of some kind with the trade mark’s owner 
by a disclaimer or warning notice at the point of sale.94 The CJEU’s reliance on the 
perception of relevant consumers in this exercise means that a court can take account 
of the particular knowledge, attentiveness and circumspection that such consumers 
would be likely to have. The so-called “average consumer” is a familiar benchmark in 
European trade mark law.95 Such consumers are the potential source of specific 
demand for marked products and how they perceive the use of the relevant sign in a 
particular context is therefore critical to the trade mark’s capacity to brand products 
and differentiate them from others on the basis of their commercial origin.  
The CJEU’s introduction of condition (vi) appears inconsistent with the 
statement in the preamble to the Directive that the core ground of infringement should 
give trade mark owners absolute protection in cases of double identity.96 The 
requirement to show a likely effect on the trade mark’s essential function also appears 
to conflict with the idea that a likelihood of confusion should be presumed in cases of 
double identity.97 Condition (vi) therefore seems to blur the distinction between the 
core ground and the second ground of infringement, which is subject to a requirement 
that there should be “a likelihood of confusion on the part of the public”.98 
                                                          
94 Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273at [57]; Case C-245/02 Anheuser-
Busch v Budejovicky Budvar [2004] ECR I-10989 at [60]. 
95 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2013] EWHC 1291 at [208]-[224]. See further J. Davis, “Locating the 
Average Consumer: His Judicial Origins, Intellectual Influences and Current Role in European Trade 
Mark Law”, [2005] IPQ183-203; J. Davis, “Revisiting the Average Consumer”, [2015] IPQ15-30. 
96 2015 Directive, recital (16); Directive, recital (11).  
97 For example, the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights 1994 (“TRIPs 
Agreement”) states that in the case of “the use of an identical sign for identical goods or services, a 
likelihood of confusion shall be presumed”: art. 15(1).  
98 Directive, art. 5(1)(b); 2015 Directive, art. 10(2)(b). 
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Nevertheless, the nature of the demand-side monopoly that the owner requires means 
that the law’s absolute protection of it should focus on situations in which relevant 
consumers are likely to perceive a third party’s use of the relevant sign as proprietary 
in nature or as conveying information about the commercial origin of its products. If 
this is the case, then the owner should enjoy absolute protection in the same way as if 
the third party were seeking to register the relevant sign as a trade mark for products 
of the relevant kind. This can be a fine distinction, but calibration of the owner’s core 
protection along these lines is necessary to prevent the owner enjoying an excessive 
demand-side monopoly, especially given the broad scope of condition (v) and the range 
of activity that may constitute using the relevant sign “in relation to” products of the 
relevant kind. If the core ground were broader in scope, there would have to be a 
comprehensive set of defences available to third parties to achieve a satisfactory 
calibration of the demand-side monopoly. The boundary between the core ground and 
the second ground of infringement can appear particularly blurred in cases concerning 
how a third party should respond to a consumers’ referential use of the relevant sign 
in requests, enquiries or searches.99 Here, however, the application of the core ground 
has to take account of the fact that the third party’s use of the relevant sign takes the 
form of an implicit representation to consumers, which the third party may have to 
qualify to respect the sign’s meaning as a trade mark. This issue will be considered 
further below. 
Condition (vi) therefore provides a general qualifying condition that secures a 
trade mark owner’s exclusive right to make proprietary use of it without conferring a 
broad monopoly that defences would have to calibrate. Moreover, it covers the wide 
range of circumstances in which a firm may use a sign in a way that brands its 
products or that signifies or conveys information about their commercial origin. This is 
especially important in the digital age when consumers can perceive the availability of 
products and gather information about them through various media and 
                                                          
99 See, for example, the discussion of this point in Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2014] EWCA Civ 1403 
at [141]-[151]. 
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intermediaries. This increases the likelihood that consumers may perceive a third 
party’s use of a sign in its advertising or other communication as signifying the 
branding of its products or as conveying information about their branding or 
commercial origin. Even where the third party intends its use of the relevant sign to be 
referential to the trade mark, relevant consumers may still be unlikely to recognise it 
as such.  
 
Securing and Qualifying the Owner’s Control over “Referential” Use of its Trade 
Mark 
The calibration of condition (vi) to protect a trade mark’s essential function gives the 
owner of a trade mark some control over the ability of third parties to make referential 
use of it. However, this leaves a third party free to use the relevant sign in this way as 
long as it does not do so in a way that creates the impression that its products are 
marked products or have an economic connection of some kind to the trade mark or 
its owner.100 As noted in section 2, there is a case for extending the owner’s control 
further, especially when the trade mark has established a presence in the minds of 
consumers that referential use can trigger and affect. The gist of this case is not that 
the owner should have a monopoly over such use, but that the owner should have 
sufficient control as to entitle it to police a third party’s use of its trade mark in 
advertising and ensure that the third party complies with the terms of applicable 
defences. These defences would give third parties some freedom to use the trade mark 
referentially in this way and would determine the extent of the owner’s control. 
However, the owner would be entitled to enforce the terms of these defences directly 
against third parties. Prior to its introduction of condition (vi), the CJEU did appear to 
have accepted that owners had control over referential use of their trade marks in 
                                                          
100 Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273at [56]. See also Case C-245/02 
Anheuser-Busch v Budejovicky Budvar [2004] ECR I-10989 at [60]; Case C-62/08 UDV North America v 
Brandtraders [2009] ECR I-1279 at [49]. 
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advertising along these lines. In BMW v Deenik, the CJEU had treated this as 
infringement under the core ground on the basis that the Directive had listed this as a 
specific instance of infringing activity.101 The CJEU’s initial elaboration of condition (vi) 
with its focus on protecting the essential function therefore appeared to call the extent 
of this control into question.  
The CJEU confirmed that trade mark owners do have more extensive control 
over referential use in advertising (or at least in comparative advertising) in its further 
elaboration of condition (vi) in L’Oréal v Bellure.102 In its judgment, the CJEU indicated 
that the third parties’ referential use of the owners’ trade marks in promotional 
material that constituted comparative advertising was ipso facto liable to affect the 
additional functions of these trade mark.103 The CJEU held that the third parties 
would only have a defence if they could show that their advertising complied with all 
the conditions of the MCAD.104 The CJEU thereby established that the owner of a 
trade mark can use the core ground of infringement to enforce the terms of the MCAD 
directly against third parties, at least where they use the exact form of the trade mark 
in their advertising.105 The CJEU has continued to treat this as being the case, 
although without stating the specific legal basis.106 The 2015 Directive has added 
further complication to understanding the legal basis of the owner’s control here by 
adding use of a sign in comparative advertising that does not comply with the 
                                                          
101 Case C-63/97 BMW v Deenik [1999] ECR I-905. 
102 Case C-487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185 at [61]-[63]. 
103 Case C-487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185 at [61]-[63].  
104 Case C-487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185 at [54], citing Case C-533/06 O2 Holdings v 
Hutchison 3G [2008] ECR I-4231 at [45] and [51]. 
105 The CJEU had previously held that, where an advertiser uses a similar sign as an approximation of the 
owner’s trade mark, there could only be infringement under one of the other grounds and the owner 
would have to satisfy the conditions of those grounds: Case C-533/06 O2 Holdings v Hutchison 3G 
[2008] ECR I-4231. 
106 Case C-159/09 Lidl v Vierzon [2011] 2 CMLR 10 (WL). 
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comparative advertising directive to the non-exhaustive list of examples of infringing 
activity.107  
As well as extending the control that a trade mark owner has over referential 
use in comparative advertising, the CJEU’s elaboration of condition (vi) has extended 
their control generally over a third party’s use of the relevant sign. Although this 
extension appears open-ended and unclear in its scope, the main impact appears to 
be that achieved through the recognition and protection of a trade mark’s “investment” 
function. As noted in section 3, this function focuses on the capacity of a trade mark 
to acquire and preserve a reputation that can attract consumers and retain their 
loyalty.108 In practice, this is most likely to protect attractive power based on an image 
or set of associations that has emotional appeal to consumers or a section of them. 
The case for extending the scope of the core ground to provide general protection for 
attractive power of this kind is very weak, given its questionable social value.109 There 
is a stronger case for extending the owner’s control specifically to cover referential use 
in advertising generally and for putting this control on a sound legal basis. The terms 
and provisos of the various applicable defences would provide the main calibration of 
the owner’s control over this kind of use and the owner would have a direct legal right 
to enforce these terms against third parties.110 Instead, the current position has 
become rather confusing. Not even the legal basis on which the owner of a trade mark 
can enforce the conditions of the MCAD is clear. The statement in the 2015 Directive 
that using the relevant sign in comparative advertising “in a manner that is contrary 
                                                          
107 “The following in particular may be prohibited under paragraph 2: … (f) using the sign in comparative 
advertising in a manner that is contrary to Directive 2006/114/EC”: 2015 Directive, art. 10(3). 
108 On the investment function, see Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440 at 
[60]. 
109 M. Senftleben, “Function Theory and International Exhaustion: Why it is Wise to confine the Double 
Identity Rule in EU Trade Mark Law to Cases affecting the Origin Function”, (2014) 36 EIPR 518-524. 
110 As well as the MCAD in the case of advertising, these include the defences specified in the Directive: 
Directive, art. 6(1); 2015 Directive, art. 14(1) & (2).  
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to” the MCAD does not clarify this and calls into question how much control the owner 
enjoys over referential use of its trade mark in other forms of advertising. 
Like the Directive, the 2015 Directive lists using the relevant sign “in 
advertising” as an instance of infringing activity.111 In BMW v Deenik,112 the CJEU held 
that referential use of this kind was infringement under the core ground, but that an 
advertiser could rely on the defences under the Directive, in particular the defence 
that covers use of a sign to convey descriptive information.113 To do so, the advertiser 
would have to show that it had complied with the general proviso to these defences 
that it was acting “in accordance with honest practices”,114 which the CJEU 
characterised as expressing “a duty to act fairly in relation to the legitimate interests of 
the trade mark owner”.115 The CJEU has indicated that a third party will violate this 
proviso not only where its advertising creates a false impression of an economic 
connection with the trade mark, but in other circumstances that are comparable to 
conditions of the MCAD.116 In the BMW case, the CJEU noted an earlier judgment 
                                                          
111 “ … (e) using the sign in business papers and in advertising”: 2015 Directive, art. 10(3). 
112 Case C-63/97 BMW v Deenik [1999] ECR I-905. 
113 “The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third party from using, in the course of 
trade … (b) indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended purpose, value, geographical origin, 
the time of production of goods or of rendering of the service, or other characteristics of goods or services; (c) 
the trade mark where necessary to indicate intended purpose of a product or service, in particular as 
accessories or spare parts … provided he uses them in accordance with honest practices in industrial or 
commercial matters”: Directive, art. 6(1). The 2015 Directive has recast these defences in substantially the 
same terms: art. 14(1) & (2). 
114 Directive, art. 6(1); 2015 Directive, art. 14(1) & (2). 
115 Case C-63/97 BMW v Deenik [1999] ECR I-905 at [61]. See also Case C-100/02 Gerolsteiner Brunnen 
v Putsch [2004] ECR I-691 at [24]; Case C-228/03 Gillette v LA-Laboratories [2005] ECR I-2337 at [41]. 
116 The third party’s use will also violate the proviso if “it affects the value of the trade mark by taking 
unfair advantage of its distinctive character or repute” or “it entails the discrediting or denigration of that 
mark” or “where the third party presents its product as an imitation or replica of the trade mark bearing 
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concerning the extent of an owner’s control over referential use of its trade mark in 
advertising.117  
In Parfums Christian Dior, the advertiser was selling legitimate marked goods, 
which the owner had already marketed as such within the EEA. The CJEU held that it 
should be free to use the trade mark referentially in advertising to publicise this 
further marketing.118 However, it limited the third party’s right to do this to strike a 
balance with the owner’s “legitimate interest” in being protected against use of the 
trade mark “for advertising in a manner which could damage the reputation of the 
trade mark”.119 The CJEU held that where the owner had cultivated an image of 
luxury and prestige for the trade mark, the third party was obliged to prevent its 
advertising “from affecting the value of the trade mark by detracting from the allure 
and prestigious image of the goods in question and from their aura of luxury”.120 Again, 
the extent of the owner’s control here is comparable to that it enjoys over referential 
use in comparative advertising under the MCAD. 
The case for extending an owner’s control over referential use of its trade mark 
in advertising beyond what is necessary to ensure that third parties respect its 
meaning rests on the fact that it is third parties who initiate use of it in this situation. 
Whilst a third party may be seeking to alert consumers of products of the relevant 
kind to the presence of alternatives to marked products, it is nevertheless seeking to 
activate a presence that the trade mark has already gained in the minds of consumers 
in order to market these alternatives more effectively. The owner should have at least a 
                                                                                                                                                                          
the trade mark of which it is not the owner”: Case C-228/03 Gillette v LA-Laboratories [2005] ETMR 
825 at [49]. 
117 Case C-63/97 BMW v Deenik [1999] ECR I-905 at [48]-[49], citing Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian 
Dior v Evora [1997] ECR I-6013 at [38]. 
118 Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior v Evora [1997] ECR I-6013 at [38]. 
119 Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior v Evora [1997] ECR I-6013 at [44]. 
120 Case C-337/95 Parfums Christian Dior v Evora [1997] ECR I-6013 at [45]. 
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qualified right to protect all aspects of the trade mark’s presence there that contribute 
to its attractive power. Moreover, there are specific defences available to qualify this 
extended control to ensure that it does not insulate the owner from effective 
competition. The CJEU’s ruling on the terms of the qualification achieved under the 
MCAD for use in comparative advertising in its judgment in L’Oréal v Bellure has 
strongly criticised for extending the owner’s control too far, thereby impeding useful 
communication and effective competition from third parties.121 However, the situation 
here is very different from the situations that arise in relation to the third operational 
function where it is consumers who initiate use of the trade mark in communication 
with third parties and third parties are in various ways responding to that use. 
 
Securing and Qualifying the Owner’s Control over Responsive Referential Use of 
a Trade Mark 
For a trade mark to be able to perform its third operational function on the demand 
side effectively, its owner needs to be able to require third parties to respect its 
meaning as a trade mark when they respond to consumers’ use of the relevant sign in 
requests, enquiries or searches. This is necessary to reflect and reinforce the owner’s 
exclusive right to make proprietary use of the relevant sign. Without this ancillary 
control, upstream firms that do not deal directly with consumers (or do not do so 
always) would not have a reliable means of reeling in and deriving full benefit from the 
                                                          
121 See in particular Jacob LJ’s criticism in his judgment in the Court of Appeal applying the CJEU’s 
ruling: L’Oréal v Bellure [2010] EWCA Civ 535 at [6]-[20]. See also D.S. Gangjee and R. Burrell, 
“Because You’re Worth It: L’Oréal and the Prohibition on Free Riding”, (2010) 73 MLR 282-304. If, as 
seems likely at the time of writing, the United Kingdom leaves the single market as well as the European 
Union, then it would have some scope to strike a different balance here and to put the regulation of 
comparative advertising on a different legal footing. 
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specific demand focused on their marked products.122 The owner of a trade mark 
needs to be able to rely on third party intermediaries to act as reliable transmission 
mechanisms for directing specific demand to marked products. However, this does not 
require giving the owner an absolute right to insist that third parties should only 
respond to consumers’ requests, enquiries and searches expressed in this way by 
supplying them with or informing them about marked products. That would be a 
major extension of the demand-side monopoly and inconsistent with the economic 
objectives of the trade mark system. It would impede competition and give the owner 
excessive market power by preventing third parties from alerting consumers to 
alternatives or from ascertaining consumers’ real intention in using the relevant sign. 
Even just requiring third part intermediaries to respect a trade mark’s specific 
meaning in their responses to consumers can still give the owner a significant 
competitive advantage where the trade mark enjoys a high level of recognition and 
cognitive availability with consumers.123 Nevertheless, trade mark law has to 
determine whether the owner’s control should extend any further. 
Calibrating the owner’s control in this context has to take account of the 
factors that distinguish it from third parties’ referential use of a trade mark in 
advertising and other communication. Here, consumers initiate use of the relevant 
sign and the core ground of infringement (along with the other grounds of 
infringement) has to regulate how third parties should respond to that use in the 
various situations in which it can occur. Moreover,, consumers may not necessarily be 
                                                          
122 See Evershed J’s comments to this effect in Sales Affiliates v Le Jean [1947] Ch 295 (HC). He 
remarked that “a great hardship and a great injustice” might be done if trade mark owners could not 
require third party intermediaries to respect the specific meaning of their trade marks since the owners 
“would have, ultimately, no means whatever of securing any sale for their products”: [1947] Ch 295 (HC) 
at 299. 
123 See, for example, “Mixing with Coke Over Trademarks is Always a Fizzle: Coca-Cola Adds a Little 
Life in Court to Those Failing to Serve the Real Thing”, Wall Street Journal, March 9, 1978 at 4, 
discussed in R. Cooter and T. Ulen, Law & Economics (5th ed) (Person Education, 2008) at 142. 
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using the relevant sign in accordance with its legal meaning as a trade mark. Some 
consumers may treat a familiar trade mark as a generic term and some may simply 
use it as a convenient starting point.124 The CJEU has addressed situations involving 
responsive referential use in its case law following its elaboration of condition (vi) in 
L’Oréal v Bellure.125 These cases have concerned the use by third parties of signs 
registered as trade marks as keywords for on-line searches.126 Where a third party has 
bought the right to use a sign in this way, then consumers using the sign as a search 
term will trigger prearranged automated responses in the form of on-line advertising 
and the like designed to alert such consumers to a third party’s products or other 
alternatives to marked products. Although the third party has taken some initiative 
through acquiring the right to use the sign as a keyword, it is at this point anticipating 
that consumers will use the sign and arranging a response. 
The CJEU has established that a third party’s use of the relevant sign as a 
keyword satisfies conditions (i) to (v) of the core ground where the third party is selling, 
supplying or marketing products of the relevant kind. The CJEU has held that the 
third party is using the sign “in relation to” its products and therefore satisfies 
condition (v) even though the third party does not use the relevant sign in its 
advertising or in the website to which it leads consumers making internet 
searchers.127 The CJEU noted that consumers (or “internet users”) initiate the use of 
the relevant sign in their quest for information about or sources of supply for marked 
                                                          
124 S. Bechtold and C. Tucker, “Trademarks, Triggers and Online Search”, (2014) 11 Journal of 
Empirical Legal Studies 718-750. 
125 Case C-487/07 L’Oréal v Bellure [2009] ECR I-5185. 
126 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417; Case C-278/08 Die 
BergSpechte v Günter Guni [2010] ECR I-2517; Case C-558/08 Portakabin v Primakabin [2010] ECR I-
6963; Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440; Case C-324/09 L’Oréal v eBay 
[2012] Bus LR 1369. 
127 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 at [60]-[74]. 
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products or products of the relevant kind.128 However, the third party has pre-
arranged an automated response to internet users’ use of the relevant sign as a search 
term with the intention that they should notice this response and investigate it.129 The 
CJEU also held that the third party would be using the relevant sign in such a way as 
to establish “a link” between the sign and the third party’s products.130 This is 
because the relevant sign forms part of the overall communication that may arise 
between the third party and internet users and the third party’s response involves an 
implicit representation to the internet user in which the relevant sign features. 
The extent of the owner’s control over keyword advertising therefore depends 
on the circumstances in which a third party’s use of the relevant as a keyword also 
satisfies condition (vi). The CJEU has rejected arguments that use of a trade mark as a 
keyword is ipso facto liable to affect one of the protected functions. It has ruled that it 
is not liable to affect the trade mark’s advertising function because it does not affect 
the owner’s ability to use the trade mark effectively to solicit specific demand.131 The 
CJEU has regarded use in keyword advertising as most likely to affect the trade 
mark’s essential function and this provides the main basis for calibrating the owner’s 
control over such use. The CJEU has held that such use would be liable to affect the 
trade mark’s essential function if it were not to enable a significant proportion of the 
relevant public to ascertain whether the third party’s products originated from the trade 
mark’s owner or from an economically-linked firm or only enabled them to ascertain this 
                                                          
128 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 at [67]-[68]. 
129 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 at [67]-[68]. 
130 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 at [72], citing Case C-17/06 
Céline v Céline [2007] ECR I-7401 at [23].  
131 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 at [96]-[98]; Case C-278/08 
Die BergSpechte v Günter Guni [2010] ECR I-2517 at [33]; Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer 
[2012] Bus LR 1440 at [54] and [59]. 
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with difficulty.132 In this context, the relevant public have the characteristics of 
reasonably well informed and reasonably observant internet users.133  As the Court of 
Appeal has observed, third parties must “craft their advertisements with appropriate 
clarity” to avoid liability for infringing the trade mark.134 In particular, even though an 
advertisement may not suggest that there is an economic link with the owner, it will 
infringe if it is sufficiently vague about the commercial origin of the promoted products 
that the relevant public are unable to determine this.135 
The responsibility that this places on third parties who wish to use trade marks 
as keywords is consistent with a general requirement that they must respect the relevant 
sign’s legal meaning as a trade mark. It adapts the core ground to this particular form of 
communication in which a third party pre-arranges an automated response to an 
internet user’s use of the sign as a search term. The requirement for clarity reflects the 
fact that the third party would otherwise be making an implicit misrepresentation about 
the commercial origin of its products in its automated response. This approach is in 
keeping with the approach that courts in the United Kingdom have taken to third parties 
who respond to requests or enquiries from consumers in person that involve the use a 
trade mark.136 A third party who sells or supplies a product that is not a marked 
product in response to such a request or enquiry without further explanation thereby 
                                                          
132 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 at [83]-[84]; Case C-558/08 
Portakabin v Primakabin [2010] ECR I-6963 at [34]; Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer 
[2012] Bus LR 1440 at [44]. 
133 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 at [84]. 
134 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2014] EWCA Civ 1403 at [144]. 
135 Cases C-236/08-238/08 Google France v Louis Vuitton [2010] ECR I-2417 at [89]-[90]; Case C-558/08 
Portakabin v Primakabin [2010] ECR I-6963 at [35]; Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer 
[2012] Bus LR 1440 at [45]. 
136 The courts have also done this where a sign has acquired origin-specific meaning as a trade mark 
through use and the owner is relying on the tort of passing off: Havana Cigar v Oddenino [1922] 2 Ch 
243 (HC); [1923] 1 Ch 179 (CA). 
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infringes the trade mark.137 The courts have treated the third party as making an 
implicit representation to the consumer that it is selling or supplying a marked 
product or a product that is economically linked in some way to the trade mark.138  
The key point to note here is that the third party does not have to rely on a 
defence to avoid liability under the core ground and the qualification of the owner’s 
ancillary right in this context does not detract from the absolute nature of the owner’s 
core right over the relevant sign that the core ground protects. A third party in such a 
case is not under an absolute obligation to sell or supply only marked products in 
response to the request or enquiry. Instead, third parties are free to seek clarification 
of a particular consumer’s intention and to alert consumers to alternative products as 
long as they explain what they are doing and make it clear when they are not selling or 
supplying marked products.139 The CJEU’s judgment in Hölterhoff v Freiesleben, in 
which it first anticipated condition (vi), is also consistent with this approach.140 On the 
basis that the third party had respected the legal meanings of the trade marks at issue, 
the CJEU held that the third party had not infringed “any of the interests which [the 
core ground was] designed to protect”.141 
However, the CJEU’s subsequent elaboration of condition (vi) appears to have 
extended the owner’s control over responsive referential use beyond what is needed to 
ensure that third parties respect the legal meaning that the relevant sign acquires as a 
trade mark. The CJEU has ruled that a third party’s use of a trade mark as a keyword 
                                                          
137 Havana Cigar v Oddenino [1922] 2 Ch 243 (HC); [1923] 1 Ch 179 (CA); Sales Affiliates v Le Jean 
[1947] Ch 295 (HC). 
138 Havana Cigar v Oddenino [1922] 2 Ch 243 (HC) at 251; [1923] 1 Ch 179 (CA) at 194 and 202.  
139 Havana Cigar v Oddenino [1922] 2 Ch 243 (HC) at 251; [1923] 1 Ch 179 (CA) at 194-195 and 202. In 
this case, the courts awarded an injunction against the third party imposing an obligation along these 
lines. 
140 Case C-2/00 Hölterhoff v Freiesleben [2002] ECR I-4187.  
141 Case C-2/00 Hölterhoff v Freiesleben [2002] ECR I-4187 at [16]. 
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may affect its investment function as well as its essential function.142 To establish an 
effect on this function, the owner must show that this use substantially interferes with 
the owner’s use of the trade mark to acquire or preserve a reputation capable of 
attracting consumers and retaining their loyalty.143 It is not enough if a third party’s 
use merely obliges the owner to adapt its efforts in this respect or if a third party’s 
activity leads to consumers switching their demand from marked products.144 As with 
the extension of the owner’s control generally, this is most likely to apply to trade 
marks that add substantial intangible value to marked products through their 
emotional appeal. It is hard to see a good reason for extending the owner’s control in 
this particular context, especially since the protection of such a trade mark’s essential 
function may already help to preserve a significant competitive advantage based on its 
cognitive availability in the minds of consumers. An advantage of this kind can be 
especially valuable in the digital age when consumers are more likely to use cognitively 
available signifiers in their searches and enquiries. 
In principle, the extension of the owner’s control to cover the additional 
functions must apply to all kinds of responsive referential use and not just keyword 
advertising. However, as with the extension of the owner’s control over referential use 
in advertising, it would have been better if the CJEU had elaborated condition (vi) in a 
way that addressed this kind of use separately and directly so that the owner’s control 
could be calibrated according to the specific issues that it raises. 
 
5. The Supply Side Monopoly and Ancillary Control 
The owner’s supply-side monopoly reflects its exclusive right to determine which 
products of the relevant kind are to be marked products and can therefore legitimately 
                                                          
142 Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440 at [66]. 
143 Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440 at [66]. 
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satisfy the specific demand that its trade mark attracts. It underpins the owner’s 
demand-side monopoly and the trade mark’s capacity to attract specific demand for 
the various reasons noted in section 2. In particular, it gives the owner the supply-side 
control that is necessary for the owner to be able to vouch for and accept commercial 
responsibility for marked products.145 This enables the trade mark to perform its 
essential function and to “offer a guarantee that all the goods or services bearing it 
have been manufactured or supplied under the control of a single undertaking which 
is responsible for their quality”.146 It also enables the owner to benefit from the trade 
mark’s power to attract specific demand whenever it is used for the first marketing of 
products in the EEA, thereby maximising the owner’s incentive to protect and 
maintain that power.   
Despite the importance of the owner’s supply-side monopoly, neither the 
specification of the core ground not the CJEU’s elaboration of it addresses it explicitly 
or focuses on the particular set of issues that it raises. The specification just implies 
that an infringing third party would be using an identical sign in relation to products 
that are not marked products. There are some provisions in the Directive that relate to 
ancillary aspects of the supply-side monopoly and these provide some guidance on its 
nature. In particular, there is the provision concerning the “exhaustion” of the owner’s 
exclusive rights after the first marketing of marked goods in the EEA, which indicates 
in broad terms that the owner should have some continuing control over the use of its 
trade mark for the further marketing of marked products which are goods.147 However, 
the scope of this continuing control should reflect and reinforce the owner’s initial 
                                                          
145 Case C-10/89 Cnl Sucal v Hag [1990] ECR I-3711; Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-
2789 at [43]. 
146 Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 at [48] and [58], citing Case C-
102/77 Hoffmann-la Roche v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139 at [7] and Case C-299/99 Koninklijke Philips 
Electronics v Remington [2002] ECR I-5475 at [30]. 
147 2015 Directive, art. 15; Directive, art.7. 
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supply-side monopoly and secure the economic value and significance of this 
monopoly.  
As for the CJEU’s elaboration of the core ground of infringement, condition (vi) 
has to secure and protect the owner’s supply-side monopoly as well as its demand-
side one. Its protection of the trade mark’s essential function should ensure that “all 
the goods or services bearing [the trade mark] have been manufactured or supplied 
under the control of a single undertaking which is responsible for their quality”.148 
However, protection of the supply-side monopoly needs to go further and ensure that 
the owner has specifically authorised particular products as marked products.149 In 
this respect, it is relevant to note that the CJEU drew its description of the trade 
mark’s essential function from its case law concerning the owner’s continuing control 
over the further marketing of marked goods.150 The court had related the essential 
function to what it termed the “specific subject-matter” of the owner’s exclusive rights, 
which it described as being “in particular to guarantee to the proprietor of the trade 
mark that he has the exclusive right to use that trade mark for the purpose of putting 
a product into circulation for the first time”.151 This refers to the need for the owner to 
authorise products as marked products when they are first marketed as such within 
the EEA. 
                                                          
148 Case C-102/77 Hoffmann-la Roche v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139 at [7]; Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC 
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150 Case C-102/77 Hoffmann-la Roche v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139 at [7]. See also Case C-10/89 Cnl 
Sucal v Hag [1990] ECR I-3711 at [14]; Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 at [38]-
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The owner’s supply-side monopoly should therefore enable the owner to control 
the quality and other characteristics of the marked products that differentiate them 
from other products of the same kind. From this perspective, it is not sufficient that 
certain products of the relevant kind are products “of” the owner in some other sense 
or for some other reason.152 The statement that a trade mark distinguishes the 
products “of one undertaking” does not give the full story. The owner’s right to 
determine which products are marked products should enable it to determine the 
precise combination of quality and other characteristics that they have in common. 
The trade mark may therefore distinguish marked products not only from the 
products of other firms, but from other brands of product of the owner that may differ 
in terms of quality and other characteristics. Moreover, for products to constitute 
marked products, it is not enough for these products to be identical to marked 
products in terms of their quality and other characteristics or even for the same 
supplier or sub-contractor to have supplied or produced them to exactly the same 
specifications as marked products.153 What is required is for the owner to have 
approved them or endorsed them as marked products at the point of first 
marketing.154 The owner’s control at this point establishes the commercial 
accountability for marked products that a trade mark is supposed to signify. As well 
as ensuring a trade mark’s effectiveness as a resource for marketing products and 
attracting specific demand to them, the supply-side monopoly also underlies the trade 
                                                          
152 This is also the case in the context of passing off: Spalding v Gamage (1915) 32 RPC 273 (HL); 
Colgate-Palmolive v Markwell [1989] RPC 497 (CA). 
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mark’s important role in business organisation.155 This role depends on both the 
owner’s exclusive control over the supply of marked products and the flexibility that 
trade mark law gives the owner as to how it can exercise that control.156 
Another implication of the control that its supply-side monopoly gives the 
owner of a trade mark is that it can use different trade marks or different 
combinations of trade marks to establish different brands for products of the same 
kind. Even though the different brands may be under the same control, they do not 
represent the same commercial origin. Products of one brand cannot satisfy demand 
expressed for the other or be marketed as another brand.157 A firm can use this facility 
to customise products in terms of their quality, design, features and other 
characteristics to attract specific demand from different groups of consumers.158  As 
noted in section 2, a firm may go further and differentiate a particular brand of 
products in terms of its image and potential emotional impact to attract specific 
demand that reflects the emotional desires of consumers. This particular application 
                                                          
155 On this role, see A.P. Griffiths, An Economic Perspective on Trade Mark Law (Edward Elgar 
Publishing, 2011) at 165-217. 
156 Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 at [37]-[39]. 
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of the product customisation and differentiation that firms can use trade marks to 
achieve has become particularly valuable with the fragmented and restless patterns of 
demand that have accompanied the growth of consumerism.159 
As regards the basis of the owner’s control over the marked products at the 
point of first marketing, the CJEU has ruled that it must be continuing so that the 
owner is in a continuing position to ensure their consistency and to control any 
divergence in this respect.160 This means that there is a continuing alignment between 
the owner’s exclusive right to authorise products as marked products and the ability 
to determine their quality and other characteristics, which establishes the commercial 
accountability for marked products that the trade mark is supposed to establish and 
signify. The owner’s absolute control at the point of first marketing also means that 
this commercial accountability can cover the characteristics of the owner as a firm, 
including standards of business behaviour. In principle, it can extend to cover 
business behaviour in the supply chain for the marked products as well and should 
therefore add to the pressure that brand owners may experience to require and 
enforce good standards of business behaviour in their supply chains.161  
The owner of a trade mark can have the necessary continuing control over 
marked products through its own governance structure (or that of a greater 
                                                          
159 On these patterns, see, for example, W. Streeck, “Citizens as Consumers: Considerations on the New 
Politics of Consumption”, (2012) 76 New Left Review 27-47 at 28-36; C. Campbell, “The Curse of the 
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undertaking of which it forms part) or through an ongoing contractual arrangement 
such as a licensing agreement. However, the voluntary disposal of a firm would not 
give the owner the requisite continuing control over the products of that firm unless it 
were supplemented by a licensing agreement or similar arrangement.162 Subject to this, 
it is not necessary for the owner to exercise its control with any particular degree of 
effectiveness: “the decisive factor is the possibility of control over the quality of goods, 
not the actual exercise of that control”.163 This explains the economic nature of the 
reassurance that a trade mark can provide to consumers.164 Moreover, the owner has 
discretion as to the legal basis on which its power of continuing control rests. This 
allows for a wide range of organisational possibilities. They include direct control as 
when production takes place in-house or within a group of a group of companies and 
indirect control through contractual mechanisms such as procurement, sub-
contracting and licensing.165 The owner is also free to alter the arrangements whereby 
it has control even though this may affect the quality or consistency of the marked 
products.166 This enables the owner to outsource production if it so decides and to do 
this behind the mask of institutional continuity that the trade mark provides for the 
marked products. As the CJEU has ruled, “the origin which the trade mark is 
intended to guarantee … is not defined by reference to the manufacturer but by 
reference to the point of control of manufacture”.167 
                                                          
162 Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789. 
163 Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 at [38].  
164 As Advocate General Jacobs noted in his Opinion in Hag II: “although trade marks do not provide any 
form of legal guarantee of quality – the absence of which may have led some to underestimate their 
significance – they do in economic terms provide such a guarantee, which is acted upon daily by 
consumers”: Case C-10/89 Cnl Sucal v Hag [1990] ECR I-3711; [1990] 3 CMLR 571 at 583. 
165 Case C-9/93 IHT v Ideal-Standard [1994] ECR I-2789 at [37]-[39]. 
166 Bostitch Trade Mark [1963] RPC 183 at 197.  
167 IHT v. Ideal-Standard [1994] 3 CMLR 857 at [37]. 
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The supply-side monopoly therefore gives the owner of a trade mark control 
over the supply of products that can legitimately satisfy the specific demand that its 
trade mark attracts. This does much to explain the various contributions that trade 
marks and the brands they signify make to the nature of commercial activity and its 
organisation. However, the CJEU’s elaboration of the core ground of infringement with 
its emphasis on protecting the trade mark’s “essential function” does not fully bring 
out the nature of this monopoly and its various implications. There are further 
shortcomings in this respect. In particular, the CJEU’s elaboration does not provide a 
clear legal explanation for the territorial dimension of the supply-side monopoly in 
European trade mark law.168 This dimension is reflected in the overall limitation on 
the doctrine of “exhaustion” as it applies to the rights of the owner of a trade mark 
after the first marketing of marked products that are goods within the EEA.169 It 
means that this doctrine only applies once goods have been marketed (or authorised 
for marketing) as marked products within the EEA.170 This means that goods that the 
                                                          
168 M. Senftleben, “Function Theory and International Exhaustion: Why it is Wise to confine the Double 
Identity Rule in EU Trade Mark Law to Cases affecting the Origin Function”, (2014) 36 EIPR 518-524. 
If, as seems likely at the time of writing, the United Kingdom exits the single market as well as the 
European Union, then it would have scope to reform the law here and adopt a different rule of exhaustion, 
giving a different territorial dimension to the supply-side monopoly. 
169 2015 Directive, art. 15; Directive, art.7. See further A.G. Chronopoulos and S.M. Maniatis, 
“Trademark Exhaustion and its Interface with EU Competition Law”, in I. Calboli and E. Lee (eds), 
Research Handbook on Intellectual Property Exhaustion and Parallel Imports (Edward Elgar, 2016) at 
343-366. 
170 Case C-355/96 Silhouette v Hartlauer [1998] ECR I-4799; Case C-173/98 Sebago v GB-Unic [1999] 
ECR I-4103. The owner can waive its exclusive right in this respect through consenting to the further 
marketing of such products as marked products, but the CJEU has ruled that its consent must be positive 
and unequivocal: Joined Cases C-414/99-C-416/99 Zino Davidoff v A & G Imports [2001] ECR I-8691. 
See also Oracle America v M-Tech Data [2012] UKSC 27. For an example of circumstances from which 
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owner has only marketed (or authorised for marketing) as marked products outside 
the EEA cannot satisfy specific demand for marked products within the EEA. 
The doctrine of exhaustion means that in the case of goods the owner’s 
absolute control over the supply of marked products that is necessary for the trade 
mark to perform its essential function only needs to be present when they are first 
marketed in the EEA. This is the point at which the owner vouches for them and the 
commercial accountability for the marked products that the trade mark signifies is 
established. This limits the scope of the supply-side monopoly and there are good 
policy reasons for doing this. It gives the owner an opportunity to secure a return from 
the power of its trade mark to attract specific demand within the EEA, but prevents 
the owner from earning multiple returns from that power for the same goods.171 The 
owner has the opportunity at this point to determine their quality and other 
characteristics of all marked products and to limit the risk that they might damage the 
trade mark’s reputation or its capacity to attract specific demand. The doctrine of 
exhaustion also facilitates “intra-brand” or “downstream” competition between marked 
goods within the EEA and encourages the emergence of a uniform market price for 
them in accordance with the principle of the free movement of goods.172 It therefore 
discourages territorial price discrimination within the EEA.173  
                                                                                                                                                                          
a court was able to infer the necessary consent, see Mastercigars v Hunters & Frankau [2007] EWCA 
Civ 176. 
171 Case C-46/10 Viking Gas v Kosan Gas (C-46/10) [2011] ETMR 58 (WL) at [31]-[32]. 
172 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (“TFEU”), art. 34. 
173  Price discrimination occurs when a firm is able to charge different prices for the same or very similar 
products to different consumers or groups of consumers: see, for example, R. Van den Bergh and P. 
Camasasca, European Competition Law and Economics: A Comparative Perspective (Sweet & Maxwell, 
2006) at 254-257.  On territorial price discrimination in this context, see K.E. Maskus, “Economic 
Perspectives on Exhaustion and Parallel Imports”, in I. Calboli and E. Lee (eds), Research Handbook on 
Intellectual Property Exhaustion and Parallel Imports (Edward Elgar, 2016) 106-124 at 112-113. See 
57 
 
Given the above points, the limitation of the doctrine of exhaustion to first 
marketing within the EEA is hard to explain as necessary to protect a trade mark’s 
essential function. It is also hard to explain as necessary to protect any of the 
additional functions that the CJEU has identified. It exists in effect as a territorial 
dimension of the owner’s supply-side monopoly and enables firms operating within the 
EEA to engage in territorial price discrimination as between the EEA and territories 
elsewhere. This territorial dimension can be justified since there are countervailing 
policy reasons against having an unlimited doctrine of “international exhaustion” at 
the point of first marketing and in favour of territorial price discrimination at the 
national or regional level.174 This can, for example, benefit consumers in lower-income 
territories and be socially advantageous for goods such as pharmaceutical products. It 
is also arguable that the owner’s ability to ensure adequate quality control over the 
downstream movement of marked goods and to combat the marketing of counterfeit 
products can be significantly more difficult with an international rule of exhaustion, 
which is also a particular concern with pharmaceutical products.175 However, the 
criticism of the CJEU’s elaboration of the core ground of infringement in this respect 
does not depend on the merits of the case for adopting a regional rule of exhaustion 
covering first marketing in the EEA. The criticism is that CJEU’s elaboration does not 
                                                                                                                                                                          
further R. Schmalensee, “Output and Welfare Implications of Monopolistic Third-Degree Price 
Discrimination”, (1981) 71 American Economic Review 242-247. 
174 See, for example, K.E. Maskus, “Parallel Imports”, (2000) 23 World Economy 1269-1284 at 1274-
1282; M. Richardson, “An Elementary Proposition Concerning Parallel Imports”, (2002) 56 Journal of 
International Economics 233-245; K. Saggi, “Regional Exhaustion of Intellectual Property”, (2014) 10 
International Journal of Economic Theory 125-137 at 126-127; K.E. Maskus, “Economic Perspectives on 
Exhaustion and Parallel Imports”, in I. Calboli and E. Lee (eds), Research Handbook on Intellectual 
Property Exhaustion and Parallel Imports (Edward Elgar, 2016) 106-124 at 112-115. 
175 See, for example, K. Lewis, “The Fake and the Fatal: The Consequences of Counterfeits”, (2009) 17 
The Park Place Economist 47-58; available at http://digitalcommons.iwu.edu/parkplace/vol17/iss1/14/ 
(accessed March 2017). 
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address the relevance of EEA regional exhaustion in this context and does not clearly 
explain why the owner of a trade mark can rely upon the core ground of infringement 
to enforce this territorial dimension of its supply-side monopoly.  
A further problem with relying upon the CJEU’s elaboration of the core ground 
of infringement to enforce the supply-side monopoly is that it does not provide a clear 
basis for calibrating the owner’s ancillary supply-side rights that are necessary to 
ensure that a trade mark can perform its intended economic role downstream. These 
ancillary rights are necessary to reflect and reinforce the absolute control that its 
supply-side monopoly gives the owner over marked products at the point of first 
marketing and the commercial accountability that this establishes. The owner needs 
some continuing control over a third party’s use of the trade mark to identity or refer 
to marked goods for further marketing downstream so that it can prevent its use in 
circumstances that are liable to damage or undermine the trade mark’s reputation 
and its power to attract specific demand. A similar point arises where the owner has 
authorised a licensee to market marked products and the licensee breaches a term of 
the agreement that relates to the quality or other characteristics of the products that 
the licensee is authorised to market as marked products. Again, the owner needs 
control over the use of its trade mark for marketing products in these circumstances. 
In order to determine the scope of the ancillary rights that the owner of a trade 
mark should have in these situations, it is first necessary to determine the matters 
over which the owner should be able to exercise control and for which the trade mark 
can establish commercial accountability. As noted already, this should include all 
matters of potential significance to consumers that the owner is in a position to 
control and may therefore wish to vouch for at the point of first marketing. The CJEU’s 
description of the essential function of a trade mark refers specifically to the owner 
being responsible for the “quality” of marked products.176 Article 8 of the Directive, 
                                                          
176 Case C-102/77 Hoffmann-la Roche v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139 at [7]; Case C-206/02 Arsenal FC 
v Matthew Reed [2002] ECR I-10273 at [48] and [58]. 
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which specifies the terms in a licensing agreement breach of which can negate the 
licensee’s entitlement to market products as marked products, specifically mentions 
terms relating to the “quality” of the products.177 The concept of product “quality” is 
elusive, especially since consumers’ preferences and priorities as to what they look for 
and expect in products have tended to change significantly over time.178 The CJEU has 
treated product “quality” as potentially including the kind of intangible quality that a 
trade mark may confer on products when it has acquired an attractive image.179 This 
is consistent with the CJEU’s identification of a trade mark’s investment function as 
one that the core ground of infringement may protect.180 The owner’s ancillary rights 
should also cover standards of business behaviour where the owner vouches for these 
                                                          
177 Directive, art. 8(2); 2015 Directive, art. 25(2)(e). 
178 B.W. Tuchman, “The Decline of Quality”, New York Times Magazine, November 2 1980 at 38–41; 
C.A. Reeves and D.A. Bednar, “Defining Quality: Alternatives and Implications”, (1994) 19 Academy of 
Management Review 419-445. See generally A.P. Griffiths, “Quality in European Trade Mark Law”, 
(2013) 11 Northwestern Journal of Technology and Intellectual Property 621-641. 
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59/08 Copad v Christian Dior Couture  [2009] ECR I-3421 at [30]-[32]. See Advocate General Kokott’s 
discussion of this point in her Opinion to the CJEU at [AG30]-[AG37]. 
180 Case C-323/09 Interflora v Marks & Spencer [2012] Bus LR 1440 at [60]. 
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standards at the point of first marketing and the trade mark has acquired a good 
reputation in this respect..181 
The Directive gives the owner some control over the use of its trade mark 
downstream through setting a limit on the doctrine of exhaustion. The provision refers 
to there being “legitimate reasons” for the owner “to oppose further commercialisation 
of the goods, especially where the condition of the goods is changed or impaired after 
they have been put on the market”.182 The CJEU has established that these reasons 
are not limited to activity downstream that affects the functional or material quality of 
the marked products.183 The CJEU has ruled that the owner has a prima facie right to 
prohibit the use of its trade mark for further marketing after any unauthorised 
interference with marked goods, including repackaging and even re-labelling.184 
However, to give full effect to the principle of the free movement of goods,185 the CJEU 
has qualified the owner’s ancillary rights here and established that a third party (such 
as a parallel importer) is entitled to use the trade mark for further marketing as long 
as it satisfies five conditions.186 The owner’s ancillary right here is therefore one of 
                                                          
181 For an example of a trade mark owner seeking to control the use of its trade mark downstream to 
protect a reputation of this kind, see Cosmetic Warriors v Amazon [2014] EWHC 181. 
182 2015 Directive, art. 15(2); Directive, art. 7(2). 
183 Case C-46/10 Viking Gas v Kosan Gas [2011] ETMR 58 (WL) at [36]. 
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[2007] ECR-3391; Case C-276/05  Wellcome v Paranova [2008] ECR I-10479.  
185 Article 36 of the TFEU provides that the protection of property rights should not constitute a “means 
of arbitrary discrimination or a disguised restriction” on trade between member states and that any 
derogation from the principle of free movement must be limited accordingly. 
186 Case C-102/77 Hoffmann-la Roche v Centrafarm [1978] ECR 1139; Case C-427/93 Bristol-Myers 
Squibb v Paranova  [1996] ECR I-3457; Pharmacia & Upjohn v. Paranova (C-379/97) [1999] ETMR 
937;Case C-143/00 Boehringer Ingelheim v Swingward (No. 1)[2002] ECR I-3762; Case C-348/04 
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being entitled to enforce these conditions against third parties downstream. One of 
these conditions secures the owner’s control in this respect by requiring the third 
party to give prior notice in writing to the owner along with a sample of the relevant 
products in their new packaging or as otherwise adapted.187 Failure to give such notice 
renders the products in question “spurious” and equivalent to unauthorised 
products.188 This condition therefore ensures that the owner has the opportunity to 
enforce compliance with the other conditions, which broadly protect the trade mark’s 
power to attract specific demand and the commercial accountability that it establishes 
for the marked goods.189 In particular, the third party must prove that any 
unauthorised interference could not have affected the original condition of the 
products inside the packaging (whether directly or indirectly) and that the 
presentation of the adapted products for further marketing (including the quality and 
appearance of their packaging) could not damage the reputation of the trade mark and 
its owner.190 The CJEU’s reference to a trade mark’s reputation in this context 
suggests that the owner’s continuing control should be broad enough to cover all 
matters that the owner is in a position to control at the point of first marketing, 
including business standards and behaviour.  
The core ground of infringement therefore has to secure the supply-side 
monopoly and the owner’s ancillary downstream control as well as a trade mark’s 
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207/10 Orifarm v Merck [2011] CMLR 10 (WL) at [26]. 
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demand-side role.191 Although the CJEU drew on its case law concerning these 
supply-side matters in its development of condition (vi), it has not directly connected 
them to each other. In substance, the core ground has provided adequate protection 
for the supply-side monopoly, but the CJEU’s elaboration of condition (vi) has not 
provided a clear legal explanation of the various features and nuances of this 
monopoly. In particular, it makes it hard to explain the monopoly’s territorial 
dimension and has obscured the full extent of the contribution of this monopoly to the 
role of trade marks in commercial activity. As regards the territorial dimension, this is 
a feature of European trade mark law, albeit a controversial one. There are sound policy 
arguments for and against having this dimension, but it needs a clear legal basis 
regardless of its merits. Addressing the supply-side monopoly directly would be one way 
of doing this. It would also ensure recognition of the commercial accountability that the 
owner’s absolute control over the first marketing of marked products and enable the 
ancillary rights that give the owner a measure of continuing control to be calibrated 
accordingly. 
 
6. Conclusion 
This article has has argued that the core ground of infringement should protect two 
monopolies that trade mark owners enjoy and various ancillary aspects of these 
monopolies. The purpose of this protection should be to ensure the effectiveness of a 
trade mark as a resource that enables its owner to compete on the basis of the quality 
and other characteristics of its products and on the owner’s merits as the commercial 
source of these products. Its demand-side monopoly should give the owner of a trade 
mark the exclusive right to use it as a means of branding products of a particular kind to 
differentiate them from others and turn them into potential objects of specific demand. 
Its supply-side monopoly gives the owner the exclusive right to supply the products that 
                                                          
191 See Arnold J’s discussion of this point in Supreme Petfoods v Henry Bell [2015] EWHC 256 (Civ) at 
[135]-[143]. 
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can satisfy this specific demand. The owner can then use the resource that these two 
monopolies secure to customise and differentiate products of the relevant kind in various 
ways, to signify commercial accountability for these products and to organise their 
production. Products branded in this way can attract specific demand for various 
reasons and the owner has significant latitude as to how it organises or reorganises the 
supply that can satisfy this demand. 
This article has shown how a trade mark, or rather the distinctive identity that it 
signifies and can confer on products, is a dynamic resource that may perform a number 
of distinct operational functions in relation to attracting and securing specific demand to 
specific products. As well as defining the object of that demand, it provides a basis for 
communicating with consumers and soliciting specific demand and a means of reeling in 
specific demand and ensuring that only marked products can satisfy this demand. It also 
provides a means whereby consumers can communicate with each other and with third 
parties about marked products and can express specific demand for them. A trade mark 
has the additional capacity to gain a presence in the minds of consumers and acquire 
additional meanings there in the form of a reputation, an image and other associations. 
As well as improving its overall effectiveness at performing its various operational 
functions, this may enable it to add intangible forms of quality to marked products that 
may appeal to the emotional desires of consumers or a section of them.  
The core ground of infringement therefore has to secure and protect a set of 
rights that cover a range of different matters. These rights need precise calibration to 
ensure that they provide sufficient protection to ensure the trade mark’s effectiveness in 
the relevant context without impeding fair competition or giving the owner excessive 
market power. The owner’s demand-side monopoly should cover only use of the relevant 
sign in a way that relevant consumers are likely to perceive as signifying or informing 
them about the commercial origin of products of the relevant kind. Specific calibration 
along these lines is necessary because of the wide range of circumstances in which and 
the wide range of reasons why the relevant sign may appear on a third party’s products 
or in communication with consumers relating to a third party’s products. Moreover, the 
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owner does not require absolute control over a third party’s referential use of the trade 
mark or over a third party’s response to a consumer’s referential use of the trade mark to 
ensure its effectiveness at performing its ancillary operational functions. There is a case 
for extending the owner’s ancillary rights to give it greater control over third parties’ 
referential use of its trade mark in advertising that promotes alternatives to marked 
products, but these rights need qualification through defences to facilitate fair 
competition. 
The CJEU’s introduction of general condition (vi) has done much to strike a 
satisfactory balance in its calibration of the core ground, especially when it has focused 
specifically on protecting a trade mark’s so-called “essential” function of guaranteeing the 
commercial origin of marked products. It would have been better if this condition had 
addressed each of the monopolies separately. For the supply-side monopoly, this could 
have put its territorial dimension on a much clearer legal footing. As it stands, the 
CJEU’s formulation of condition (vi) does not provide a satisfactory basis for calibrating 
the ancillary aspects of each monopoly. It does not give the owner a clear legal position 
from which it can exercise control over a third party’s referential use of the trade mark in 
advertising and enforce the terms and condition of the defences on which a third party 
should rely. The CJEU has sought to overcome this deficiency through invoking various 
additional functions that may require protection, but this does not provide a coherent 
framework for the task. The 2015 Directive’s declaration that use of a trade mark in 
comparative advertising that infringes the MCAD constitutes infringing activity adds to 
the confusion here. The CJEU’s elaboration of condition (vi) of the core ground has also 
added complexity to the calibration of the owner’s control over responsive referential use 
of its trade mark for keyword advertising and potentially over other forms of responsive 
referential use as well. 
In other respects, the effect of the CJEU’s elaboration of condition (vi) has been to 
extend the scope of the owner’s control generally and to disturb the more satisfactory 
overall balance that the CJEU had previously struck. The functions that the CJEU has 
invoked for this purpose do not readily map onto the ancillary operational functions that 
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a trade mark may perform on its demand side. They also do not address the territorial 
dimension and other features of the supply-side monopoly and the ancillary rights over 
use of its trade mark for further marketing of marked goods downstream that the owner 
requires. The CJEU’s additional functions relate more to a trade mark’s capacity to gain 
a presence in the minds of consumers and acquire additional meanings, in particular in 
the form of an attractive image. The case for protecting this capacity is debatable and it 
would be better to do this directly. It would also be useful to ensure that any extension of 
the overall protection of trade mark owners gives firms a clear incentive to develop a good 
reputation for business behaviour and to use their control to enforce good standards 
upstream and downstream.  
In conclusion, it would be better if the core ground of infringement were to 
address the two monopolies and the ancillary aspects of each monopoly separately and 
directly, according to the specific set of issues that they each raise. 
 
 
